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INTRODUCTION

"[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the
expense of complying with discovery requests."'
Since 1978, changes in technology have allowed litigants in civil
cases to create and store much more information than has ever been
possible before. Unfortunately, the costs of searching through these
ever-growing sources of electronically stored information threaten to
undermine the civil litigation system. Indeed, many civil litigants
may find that they cannot sustain the costs of the discovery-related
litigation. As a result, these civil litigants will never be able to obtain
a judicial resolution of the merits of their case.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even though they were
amended in 2006 specifically to address the costs and scale of ediscovery, not only fail to contain the cost or scope of discovery, but,
in fact, encourage expensive litigation ancillary to the merits of civil
litigants' cases. This Article proposes that the solution to this
dilemma is to eliminate the presumption that the producing party
should pay for the cost of discovery. This rule should be abandoned in
favor of a rule that would equally distribute the costs of discovery
between the requesting and producing parties.

A.

The Problem

To an outsider, the American judicial system must seem very
puzzling. A defendant facing the death penalty in a criminal case has
"no general constitutional right to discovery,"2 and generally has no
1. Justice Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., writing for the Court in Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
2. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 233 (2010); Mary Prosser,
Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New Realities, 2006
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due process right to even interview prosecution witnesses, much less
to depose them prior to trial.3 While some courts have been, in the
interest of justice, inclined to grant limited discovery in serious
criminal cases, the defining judicial view of criminal discovery in the
United States was set forth by the eminent American jurist Learned
Hand, who stated that, in criminal cases, "[The Court's right to grant
discovery] is said to lie in discretion, and perhaps it does, but no
judge of this court has granted it, and I hope none ever will."4
Civil litigants suing for mere money, on the other hand, have a
vast arsenal of no-holds barred, intrusive, and often extravagantly
expensive investigative discovery weapons available to them in most
courts, both state and federal.5 These weapons include the right to
depose witnesses under threat of contempt for failure to appear,6
serve interrogatories,7 demand production of documents,8 compel
answers to written questions,9 and demand admissions of
wrongdoing under oath and penalty of perjury.10 In the quest for
evidence to use against an opponent in court, the civil litigant can
even demand that an opponent submit to a potentially degrading

WIs.

L. REV. 541, 561 (2006) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002);
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474
(1973)). Prof. Prosser also describes a case where a defendant, who was charged and
convicted of an armed robbery, was not able to timely obtain discovery about an
alternate suspect that had been disclosed to police. Id. at 541-45. By the time the
defendant managed to obtain the alternate suspect information, the witness who had
provided the alternate suspect information could not be found. Id. In spite of the
weakness of the case, the defendant was convicted of the crime. Id. See generally FED.
R. CRIM. P. 16-17; infra Part I (briefly describing the evolution of discovery practice)
and Part IV (contrasting discovery practices in other countries).
3. 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 233 (2010); see Daniel B. Garrie &
Daniel K. Gelb, E-Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Need for Specific Rules, 43 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 393, 399-400 (2010) (citing Degan v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 825
(1996)).
4. Prosser, supra note 2, at 583 (quoting United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646,
649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)).
5. See Note, Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes And Cures, 92
YALE L.J. 352, 353-56 (1982) [hereinafter Discovery Abuse].
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (permitting the court to sanction a party for failure to
comply with the court's discovery orders); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) (allowing the
court to hold a party in contempt for refusing to comply with the court's discovery
orders); FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (allowing a party to take depositions of other parties to
litigation).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 33 (allowing a party to submit interrogatories).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (allowing a party to request the production of documents,
electronically stored information, and "tangible things" and to enter another's land for
the purpose of inspecting a property or object on a property).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 31 (providing for deposition, based on written questions, of "any
person . .. without leave of court.").

10.

FED. R. Civ. P. 36 (authorizing requests for admission on any party).
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physical and psychiatric examination.11
Not surprisingly, the exercise of such broad and invasive
investigatory powers by private litigants in American civil courts has
appalled much of the civilized world, particularly when American
courts purport to authorize or even order an investigative process
that extends, vigilante-like, into other countries.12 Accordingly,
several countries (most notably France, the United Kingdom, and
Switzerland), have acted to protect the privacy of their citizens by
enacting "blocking" statutes which can make compliance with an
American court's discovery order a criminal offense punishable by
severe fines and imprisonment. 13
In addition, EU privacy laws strictly forbid the disclosure of "any
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual,"
which includes even such mundane information as e-mail
addresses.14 A French Commission15 has held that "certain
disclosures under the [U.S.] Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure]
'breach the French legal provisions on data protection,"'16 and the
U.K.'s Information Commissioner has declared that "it violates the
EU [privacy] directive for an individual outside of the European
Union to access personal data hosted on a U.K. Web site."7 And,
several European courts have held that any discovery ordered by an
American court must not only come under their own supervision, but
must also comply with their own interpretation of the Hague
Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters.18

Although foreign countries enact blocking statutes to protect
11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 35 (permitting the court to order a physical or medical
examination of a party when the party's "mental or physical condition ... is in
controversy").
12. See Shannon Capone Kirk et al., When U.S. E-Discovery Meets E. U.
Roadblocks, NAT'L LAW J., Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/
PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202426918666.
13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(a), 1995 O.J. (L. 281)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. Id. (referring to the French Commission Nationale de L'informatique et Des
Libertis (CNIL)).
16. Id. (citing Discovery Case: Another Sensitive Issue with the USA, CNIL,
http://www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/discovery-case/ (cited article no longer
available online)).
17. Id.
18. Seth Berman, Cross-border Challenges for E-Discovery, 11 BUS. L. INT'L 123,
127 (2010). Berman notes that this can even "prevent a corporation from collecting its
own data, or interviewing its own employees, if the purpose of that data gathering is to
comply with [U.S.] discovery demands." Id.
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their citizens from what they see as American courts' unjustified
attempts to extend American hegemony in flagrant disregard of the
privacy rights of their own citizens, American courts have thus far
showed little respeci for such statutes or the purported rights of
foreign citizens for whose protection these statutes were enacted.19
For example, in Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A.,20 an American court
ordered a defendant to produce a document in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, despite the fact that such
production would violate French privacy laws.21 When the American
court dismissed the defendant's concern about French privacy laws
and persisted in ordering the document production, the French
lawyer against whose client the order was directed reluctantly
complied.22 The lawyer was subsequently criminally prosecuted by
French authorities and convicted of violating French privacy laws,
and the French supreme court later affirmed his conviction and
fine.23 Although the defendant was sentenced to a criminal fine of
C10,000 (about $15,000), it was widely believed that the only reason
the defendant did not receive a lengthy prison sentence was that he
was a French citizen.24
The lack of respect shown by American courts for privacy rights
protected by foreign and EU statutes has led Judge Simon H. Rifkind
to observe that a .'foreigner watching the discovery proceedings in a
civil suit would never suspect that this country has a highly-prized
tradition of privacy enshrined in the Fourth Amendment."'25 But
privacy is not the only basis for resistance to American discovery
demands. Indeed, many courts in the EU view the use of discovery in
American courts as an example of the kind of "abuse of court process"
that would be the subject of disciplinary action or contempt if
attempted in their own courts. 26 And, commenting on one high profile
case-the Westinghouse Uranium litigation-one legal scholar noted

19. See id. at 129.
20. 242 F.R.D. 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
21. Id. at 225.
22. Id.
23. Kirk et al., supra note 12 (citing In re Advocat "Christopher X," Cour de
Cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] Paris, Chambre Criminelle,
Dec. 12, 2007 (Fr.)).
24. Berman, supra note 18, at 128; Kirk et al., supra note 12 (noting examples of
enforcement of foreign privacy laws in response to American litigation).
25. Hein Katz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 DUKE J.
OF COMP. & INT'L L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 61, 74 (2003) (quoting Simon H. Rifkind, Are We
Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 107 (1976)).
26. Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective:Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL
L. REV. 299, 307 (2002) (quoting Warren Pengilley, United States Trade and Antitrust

Laws: A Study of InternationalLegal Imperialism from Sherman to Helms Burton, 6
COMPETITION & CONSUMER L.J. 208 (1999)).
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that the "'the House of Lords regarded the [U.S.] discovery process as
being a fishing expedition and thus an abuse of court process."'27
Indeed, equating "fishing expeditions" with abuse of process
appears to be the prevalent theme among foreign jurists. As one
Australian jurist put it: "a person who has no evidence that fish of a
particular kind are in a pool desires to be at liberty to drag it for the
purpose of finding out whether there are any there or not." 28 Another
commentator has noted that "'Canada and Great Britain view much
United States discovery as a fishing expedition."'29 Other
commentators have noted that "what the French fear most is not the
revelation of damaging material but rather the occurrence of 'fishing
expeditions,' i.e. any request that is not for a clearly identified
document."30
Professor Stephen Subrin, in his aptly titled article Discovery in
Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, posits that, from the global
perspective, the negative connotations of American discovery include
"wasted time and expense for both private individuals and the court
system, invasions of privacy, and the unfairness of forcing defendants
to expend resources when plaintiffs do not have advance information
of liability."31 More pointedly, Hein Kotz, a former dean of Bucerius,
the first private law school in Germany, and director of the Max
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Private Law, has
noted strong feelings abroad "that it is possible and by no means rare
in the United States for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit in order to
discover whether he might actually have one."32
Proponents of broad and invasive discovery have often justified it
by arguing that it harnesses the profit motive on the part of private
citizens-effectively deputizing them-to go and ferret out
wrongdoing, particularly by corporations, that would not otherwise
be discovered.33 In light of this rationale, resistance to fishing
27. Id.
28. Id. (quoting Hooker Corp. v. Australia (1985) 80 F.L.R. 94, 104 (Austl.)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. Id. (citing E. Charles Routh, ALI-ABA, Dispute Resolution - Representing the
Foreign Client in Arbitration and Litigation, in GOING INTERNATIONAL:
FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 592 (1996)).
30. Id. at 307-08 (quoting Vincent Mercier & Drake D. McKenney, Obtaining
Evidence in France for Use in United States Litigation, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 91,
51 (1994)). See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The
HistoricalBackground of the 1938 FederalDiscovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 (1998).
31. Subrin, supra note 26, at 308.
32. Kotz, supra note 25, at 61 n.*, 74.

33. See Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules
Really in Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 519-20 (1998) (noting that,
according to proponents of broad discovery, "broad discovery has enhanced, and
perhaps even expanded, enforcement of substantive rights"). Niemeyer also notes that
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expeditions may be explained in part by the notion that the private
enforcement of laws ought to be left to public officials-government
investigators, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers-rather than
plaintiffs seeking money.
The other traditional rationale for liberal discovery rules is that
if each party to a lawsuit knows everything about the other side's
case, settlement will be more likely to follow.34 This Article argues
that the exact opposite is the case: overly liberal discovery rules
encourage profligate, time-consuming, and expensive discovery and
incentivize a relatively risk-free factual inquiry while the lawyer's
meter is running. In such cases, settlement generally comes on the
courtroom steps only days before the scheduled trial. Given the
inclination of lawyers to hold out until trial to get the best deal
possible, an early trial date is far more likely to induce settlement;
and early trial dates are only possible if the entire process is
streamlined, and the crippling costs of discovery mitigated by rules
that equitably allocate the costs of discovery.
Although those who justify broad American-style discovery
conjure up the impecunious plaintiff whose only hope of taking on a
large stonewalling corporation is the panoply of producer-funded
discovery tools authorized under rules 26-37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the studies of the Institute for the Advancement of
the American Legal System35 have revealed that the availability of
expensive discovery devices hardly favors the impecunious. On the
contrary, a well-heeled litigant can effectively win a case by
overpowering its opponent with onerous discovery demands; a poorly
funded opponent faced with these tactics must eventually agree to
settle the case for a pittance without the merits ever being
addressed.36 Furthermore, juries are rendered irrelevant on issues
some corporations that are frequent litigation targets might actually prefer the tort
system of deterrence and compensation to "an additional layer of government
regulation that might follow if the full disclosure requirement was eliminated." Id. at
520.
34. Subrin, supra note 30, at 698, 716 (noting that Edson Sunderland, who drafted
the discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, viewed broad discovery as
"permitting each side to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their cases in
advance, frequently making trials unnecessary because of informed settlement").
35. The Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System ("IAALS") "is
a national, non-partisan organization dedicated to improving the process and culture
of the civil justice system." Mission, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYSTEM, http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/mission.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). The
IAALS is directed by former Colorado Supreme Court Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis.
Who

We

Are,

INST.

FOR

THE

ADVANCEMENT

OF THE

AM.

LEGAL

SYSTEM,

http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/whoweare.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
36. See AM. COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE
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relating to the merits of a case because, as a practical matter, judges
effectively determine the winners by handing down discovery
rulings-and these rulings often follow acrimonious and prolonged
discovery litigation that can dwarf a trial on the merits of the case in
time and expense. 37
Moreover, suggestions that invasive discovery somehow favors
plaintiffs are belied by such cases as United States v. Phillip
Morris,38 in which defendant Phillip Morris demanded the production
of electronically stored information from over thirty federal agencies,
"yielding [over] 200,000 e-mail 'hits,"' compliance with which
"required a 'small army' of lawyers, law clerks and activists working
full time for over six months,"39 all costing millions of dollars.40
Nor are the discovery horror stories limited to the monumental
cases. They now include even simple and routine cases, including
divorce cases. In one Connecticut case the Institute examined, a
husband fishing for something scandalous on his wife's laptop
demanded that the court order his wife to not only produce her laptop
for forensic examination by experts, but to "stop using, accessing,
turning on, powering, copying, deleting, removing or installing any
program, files and or [sic] folders or booting up her laptop."41 The
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 9 (rev. April 15, 2009) [hereinafter

FINAL REPORT], available at http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/pubs/ACTL-IAALS%20
Final%20Report%20rev%208-4-10.pdf (noting that 71 percent of survey respondents
thought litigants used discovery "as a tool to [coerce a] settlement"); Discovery Abuse,
supra note 5, at 357 ("[Dliscovery benefits a litigant by allowing him to threaten to
impose costs-in the form of burdensome requests-upon his opponent. A rational
opponent will then offer the threatening party a more favorable settlement to avoid
the costs of responding to the threatened discovery requests.").
37. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM, ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINES 21 (2008) [hereinafter FRONT LINES],
available at http://www.du.edullegalinstitute/pubs/EDiscovery-FrontLines.pdf (noting
that, according to one expert, "organizations with strong, but modest-sized casescases that they would have pursued before the advent of e-discovery-may choose not
to pursue those claims because the predicted e-discovery costs would exceed the
expected recovery"); see also In Re: FannieMae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 816-18 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (describing litigation in which a non-party government office expended over
$6 million, amounting to more than nine percent of the agency's annual budget, but
failed to fully satisfy e-discovery requests for archived e-mail messages).
38. 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 566 F.3d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also FRONT LINES, supra note 37, at 8 (describing the
magnitude of the discovery conducted in Philip Morris); George L. Paul & Jason R.
Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10,
T$ 16-18 (2007) (describing government's difficulty responding to requests for
voluminous discovery in Phillip Morris).
39. FRONT LINES, supra note 37, at 8.
40. See id. at 5.
41. See id. at 6 (citing Ranta v. Ranta, No. FA980195304S, 2004 WL 504588, at *1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 2004)).
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court granted the request, leaving the wife in fear of even touching
her computer for fear of being punished by the court for
"spoliation."42
Indeed, as discussed in more detail in Part II, the costs of
American discovery have risen to such a high level that many
Americans with real disputes requiring resolution are simply
excluded from the courts and, thus, from any real chance of obtaining
justice in a peaceable manner.43 This consequence has aroused the
interest and concern of the Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System ("the Institute"). The Institute's recent focus
has been on a particularly contentious subcategory of discovery
known commonly referred to as "e-discovery," which refers to
discovery of electronically stored information ("ESI"). The Institute
has observed that, because of "the sheer [volume] of electronic
information" now stored in computers and databases around the
country, litigants incur "staggering costs" in discovery.44 Over 30
billion e-mails are generated by federal agencies alone,45 and that is
only the tip of the iceberg. And, among the themes revealed by a
survey 46 of the fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers
conducted by the Institute in 2009 was that discovery costs "far too
much and, [has] become an end in itself;" the survey also revealed
that "[t]he discovery rules . . . are "impractical in that they promote

full discovery at a value above almost everything else."47
The increasing costs of broad discovery threaten to overwhelm
the civil justice system. In the past, broad discovery at the expense of
producers may have been a reasonable approach to allocating the
costs of discovery because a producer's search costs consisted mostly
of the labor associated with combing through a manageable set of file
cabinets, work papers, and boxes of paper documents.48 As
individuals and businesses have shifted from keeping paper records
42. Id. (citing Ranta, No. FA980195304S, 2004 WL 504588, at *1).
43. United States Magistrate Judge James K. Bredar remarks that:
On the one hand, the purpose of litigation is to find the truth of the matter,
so the availability of more information that might be relevant to that quest is
a good thing. On the other hand, recent experience teaches that meaningful
and complete access to new information troves is expensive - prohibitively so
for some litigants. The just resolution of a dispute has little value to a party
if bankruptcy was the price of its achievement.
FRONT LINES, supranote 37, at 1.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 8.
46. The survey was sent to 3,812 fellows, and 1,494 responded to the survey. FINAL
REPORT, supranote 36, at 2.

47. Id.
48. See SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL.,
EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 43 (2009).

ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL
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to keeping computerized records, however, the scale and variety of
stored information makes production a task of a much larger
magnitude.49 The costs associated with searching and producing
responsive information from this ever-expanding body of information
has increased along with the size of the body itself.50 And the amount
of data that individuals, businesses, and other entities store is
increasing exponentially.51
For instance, in a racial discrimination case against the Secret
Service in 2000, the plaintiff demanded a search of over 20 million
electronic documents generated over a period of sixteen years,
netting a grand total of exactly ten e-mails potentially helpful to the
plaintiff. The millions of dollars such a search surely consumed
exceeded by many times the amount in controversy in the case. 52
Indeed, when one considers just the cost of attorney review of
millions of documents for privilege, the potential costs rise to
astronomical levels.53
In 2009, a survey conducted by a joint project of the American
College of Trial Lawyers ("ACTL") Task Force on Discovery and the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
revealed that seventy-five percent of ACTL members believed that
"electronic discovery has resulted in a disproportionate increase in
the expense of discovery and thus an increase in total litigation
expense."54 Seventy-six percent stated that "courts do not understand
49. Paul & Baron, supra note 38, 1 10-13, 21-23.
50. Id. T 14-20.
12, 20.
51. Id.
52. See FRONT LINES, supra note 37, at 8.
53. See id. at 5 (describing typical e-discovery costs and estimating that a
"midsize" case will incur $2.5 to $3.5 million in costs).
54. FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 15-16. In addition, one of the co-authors of
this article, Professor Robert Hardaway, conducted a survey of attorneys in civil cases
to evaluate the perception of the bar with respect to the costs of discovery. The study
involved 500 randomly selected cases filed and closed between the years 2004 and
2006 in Colorado, Delaware, and Oregon. Surveys were sent to both the plaintiffs
attorney and defendant's attorney for each case. The surveys aimed to determine the
resources used by the attorneys in each case and the attorneys' perception of the cost
effectiveness of discovery both on a case-by-case basis and generally. Each survey
contained the following questions:
1. What size was your firm when you handled this case?
2. Were you counsel for the plaintiff or defense?
3. What was the approximate length of the case, from filing to disposition?
4. What was the total cost of discovery in this case?
5. What was the ultimate recovery in this case?
Answer whether you Strongly Agree, Agree, are Neutral, Disagree, or
Strongly Disagree with the following statements:
6. In regard to this particular case, the benefits of discovery justified the
cost.
7. Generally speaking, the benefits of discovery justify the cost.
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the difficulties parties face in providing electronic discovery."55 The
study further revealed that respondents believed electronic discovery
to be "a nightmare and a morass,"56 and that recent attempts by the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to address the issue in new rule
26(b)(2) were "inadequate."57
With regard to potential sanctions set forth in rule 37(e) for
failure to comply with a court's discovery orders, respondents felt
that the legal tests for discovery compliance were "not selfexplanatory and [we]re difficult to execute in the world of modern
information technology."58 Most telling was the respondents'
complaint that standards such as 'undue cost and burden,'
'reasonably accessible,' 'routine good faith operation,' and 'good
cause"' presented "traps for even the most well-intentioned
litigant."59
The latter observations lead us to the crux of the problem with
American discovery rules generally, and rules relating to e-discovery
specifically: the costs of litigating, arguing and contending with
subjective and slippery discovery "standards," as explained fully in
Part III, can push the total cost of litigation so high that people with
legitimate disputes in need of resolution are simply excluded from
the process. A 2007 study, published under the auspices of the
Of the surveys returned, twenty were from plaintiffs' attorneys and twenty-four were
from defendants' attorneys. Exactly half of the responses (twenty-two attorneys)
revealed that in their particular case, the attorney either strongly agreed or agreed
that the benefits of discovery justified the cost. Of those twenty-two, eighty-six percent
believed that, in general, the benefits of discovery justify the cost. However, these
responses varied depending on which party the attorney represented. Among attorneys
for plaintiffs, seventy percent believed that the cost of discovery was justified in their
particular case and sixty percent believed the cost is justified generally. However,
among attorneys for defendants, only forty-six percent believed the cost of discovery
was justified in their particular case and forty-two percent believed the cost of
discovery is justified generally. On average, the cost of discovery for defendants
equaled ninety-five percent of the total recovery ordered. For plaintiffs, the cost of
discovery equaled forty-one percent of the amount recovered.

55. Id.; see also Nicola Faith Sharpe, Corporate Cooperation Through CostSharing, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 109, 126-30 (2009) (noting that the
recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have not been especially
successful because the rules still rely on judges to intervene to curb abusive discovery
and suggesting that judges do not, and perhaps cannot, effectively perform this
function).
56. FINAL REPORT, supranote 36, at 14.
57. Id.; see also Sharpe, supra note 55, at 127 (2009) (noting that "a majority of
lawyers felt that they did not receive 'adequate and efficient help from the courts in
resolving discovery disputes and problems"') (quoting Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery:

Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its PrincipalProblems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B.
FouND. RES. J. 787, 862-63 (1980)).
58. FINAL REPORT, supranote 36, at 14.
59. Id.
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Center for International Legal Studies, estimated that in
"commercial litigation, the collection and review of documents alone
can amount to 30-40 percent. . . of the total litigation expense, with a
comparable expenditure for other discovery."60 And the Rand
Institute for Civil Justice reports that up to "90 [percent] of the costs
of e-discovery may be attributable to 'eyes-on' ESI review by
attorneys."61 And there is no question that this review is not only
costly, but generates a vast quantity of "drudge work" that displaces
more interesting, rewarding, and socially valuable work within the
legal profession.62 One mid-level associate who spent two of the first
three years of her career reviewing documents now predicts that
"unless some checks on this system are developed, the explosion of
electronic information has the capability to destroy the civil litigation
system."63

B. Attempts to Solve the Problem
The threat to the civil litigation system posed by the current
discovery rules, and by e-discovery rules in particular, is now well
documented in numerous law review articles,64 papers, and studies
produced by institutes and conferences ranging from the Institute for
the Advancement of the American Legal System65 to the American
College of Trial Lawyers,66 and the Rand Institute for Civil Justice.67
This article argues, however, that the proposals for meeting this
threat have to date been inadequate to meet that threat, and that
immediate, objective, and even revolutionary measures in the form of
new rules are now required to rescue a civil system on the verge of
self-destruction and collapse.
Appellate court decisions have been less than helpful in setting
objective and practical e-discovery standards.68 Appellate decisions
60. THE COMPARATIVE LAw YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 24 (Dennis
Campbell ed., 2007).
61. FRONT LINES, supra note 37, at 20 (citing JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., RAND
INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF E-DISCOVERY:
OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 3 (2008), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/
occasional-papers/2008/RANDOP183.pdf).
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 25, 30, 36-38, and 62 and accompanying text; infra notes 83,
93-97 and accompanying text.
65. See FRONT LINES, supranote 37; FINAL REPORT, supra note 36.
66. FINAL REPORT, supranote 36.
67. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 621.
68. See id. at 7 (noting that there are very few appellate court opinions to guide
trial courts in their application of the law related to e-discovery). The report also notes
that Texas and Mississippi have done the most to explicitly address the costs of ediscovery in their civil procedure rules. Id.
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that meaningfully address discovery issues are rare because (1) most
cases are settled, (2) those that go through trial and appeal rarely
turn on the discovery rulings, and (3) appellate courts afford the
broadest of discretion to the discovery rulings of trial courts. 69
Interlocutory review of discovery orders is, of course, even rarer.70
Courts seeking guidance on e-discovery law have therefore had
to resort to trial court decisions, even those of courts in other circuits.
The case cited most often is the 2003 employment discrimination
case Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,71 litigated in the Southern District of
New York. In that case, the plaintiff, hoping that something
incriminating might be found in the computer files of the defendant
company, demanded "all documents concerning any communication
by or between UBS employees concerning Plaintiff. . . includ[ing],
without limitation, electronic or computerized data compilations."72
Not satisfied with the 350 pages of documents and 100 pages of emails defendant produced, the plaintiff also demanded any and all
additional e-mails that might be found in "deleted" files stored on
backup media.73 When advised that the cost of producing such tapes
would exceed $300,000, the plaintiff not only persisted in demanding
that the defendant produce the backup tapes, but also that the
defendant should pay the entire $300,000 cost of retrieving and
producing them.74
69. Id.; e.g., Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1982) ("A trial
court enjoys wide discretion in determining the scope and effect of discovery. It is, in
fact, unusual to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters."). Dertouzos et al.
note that "the number of instances where (1) an e-discovery dispute resulted in an
unsatisfactory outcome, (2) a judge actually ruled on the discovery issue, and (3) there
was a final judgment in the case providing the necessary conditions for appellate
review would be extremely few in number." DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 61, at 7.
But see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
Of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 935 (1987) ("If the
decision of litigated questions were to depend upon the will of the Judge or upon his
notions of what was just, our property and our lives would be at the mercy of a
fluctuating judgment, or of caprice. The existence of a system of rules and conformity
to them are the essential conditions of all free government. . . .") (quoting D.D. FIELD,
Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science, reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS,
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 517, 530 (A. Sprague ed., 1884)
(Address at the opening of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Sept. 21,
1859)).
70. DERTOUZOs ET AL., supra note 61, at 7. Some discovery orders, such as those
ordering physical and mental examination, have sometimes been held to be subject to
extraordinary writ review. See, e.g., Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 108-09
(1964).
71. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
72. Id. at 312.
73. See id. at 312-13, 313 n.19. The backup media included both tapes and optical
disks. Id. at 314.
74. See id. at 313.

534

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

In the style of an appellate court, the trial judge in that case,
U.S. District Judge Shira Scheindlin (who is also co-author of a
casebook entitled Electronic Discovery and Digital Evidence75)
invented a new "Seven-Factor Test"76 incorporating a series of subject
balancing tests almost guaranteed to incite acrimonious litigation
and contention. After applying this test, the court ordered the
defendant to produce at its own expense all e-mails on optical disks
as well as a selected number of backup tapes to be the subject of costshifting arguments at a later time.77
Without any appellate or Supreme Court guidance establishing
judicial standards for the special case of e-discovery, the core of
Zubulake's holding appears to have been based on dicta in a twentyfive year old Supreme Court case that "the presumption is that the
responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests."78 Even though this dictum pre-dated e-discovery by at
least a decade, this fact did not inhibit the Zubulake court in
conjuring up its new seven-part test for assessing whether requests
for ESI warranted any shifting of the costs of production to the
requesting party.79
In response to such cases, Rule 26 was amended on December 1,
2006. In what may prove to be the most unhelpful provision ever
codified in the form of a rule, amended Rule 26(f) sidestepped most of
the e-discovery issues likely to arise during the pre-trial process by
simply urging the parties to "confer" on discovery issues8opresumably in hopes that if the parties could somehow agree on such
issues as whether one party should cough up a third of a million
dollars in retrieval fees (as in Zubulake), the trial court would be let
off the hook for having to decide the most critical discovery issues. (If
counsel could indeed negotiate such issues, one assumes that
reaching a final settlement would be relatively easy.)
In recognition that at least some contingency provision must
provide for what happens if the parties do not agree on a discovery
75. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48.
76. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 322, 324. The Zubulake court adapted its test from the
eight-factor version of a similar test applied in Rowe Entertainment v. William Morris
Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 316, 32124.
77. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
78. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) ("[The
presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with
discovery requests, but he may invoke the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c)
to grant orders protecting him from 'undue burden or expense."'); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)
(allowing a court to issue an order protecting a party of the "undue burden" of

production); see also Zubulake, 217 F.R.D at 317.
79.
80.

Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 316-24.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f).
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issue, amended Rule 26(b)(2) requires a party to produce ESI if it is
"reasonably accessible"; however, if the party can show that the data
sought is not reasonably accessible because of "undue burden or
cost," the opposing party can nevertheless require production if he
can show "good cause."81 The whole issue of cost-shifting is
apparently dealt with by a provision stating that the court may
"specify conditions for the discovery."82
Others have since recognized that littering discovery rules with
such terms as "good cause," "undue burden," and "reasonably
accessible" not only fails to offer a solution to the e-discovery
problem, but, as discussed further in Part III, makes the problem
worse by creating additional points of litigation and contention that
will only increase the ninety percent of litigation costs now allocated
to discovery and further delay the adjudication of the actual merits of
cases.

Writing in the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology,
Professor Henry Noyes observed that
[flor more than twenty years, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
governing discovery have been poked, prodded, and tweaked - but
never overhauled - to combat the problem of discovery run amok.
The one constant in this process .. . has been increasing reliance on
judges to exercise their discretion to limit discovery. The
rulemakers have hoped that judges will rescue the discovery
process from itself.83
Amended Rule 26(f) justifies Professor Noyes's conclusion that
"the rulemakers have continued to pepper the [discovery] [r]ules with
meaningless good cause standards. Good cause is ... bad medicine
for the discovery rules."84 Even more to the point is Noyes's
observation that "experience ha[s] shown that judges' discretion is
guided by the historical policy of liberal discovery, which has
overwhelmed the language and structure of the discovery
amendments."85
Indeed, one might wonder why the rulemakers have failed to
enact rigorous and realistic solutions to the problem of rising
discovery costs. As Professor Noyes asks, "Why would the rulemakers
spend significant time and energy on the e-discovery amendments if
they knew that the amended rule[s] would not reduce the cost and
burden of discovery, but would instead increase judicial discretion?"86
81.
82.

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
See id.; Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 317-18.

83. Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules,
21 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 49, 95 (2007).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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His answer is disheartening, particularly because it has the ring of
truth: "Judges have come to dominate membership on the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee in recent years and judges tend to favor broad
discretion."87
Noyes further notes that debate over whether to reform the
discovery rules "generally falls along party lines-plaintiffs' lawyers
on one side, defense lawyers on the other."8s The judges on the
committee avoided making hard choices by relying on broad judicial
discretion. This enabled them to cater to the demands of defense
lawyers by "publicly stating that the amendments would limit the
burden of discovery," but at the same time catering to the plaintiffs'
lawyers by assuring them that "in practice, courts would rely on the
familiar and friendly mantra of liberal discovery to interpret the
vague good cause standard."89
Somewhat more helpful in addressing discovery problems than
trial court opinions or the recent rule amendments are some of the
suggestions offered by think tanks and institutes. These range from
"[p]roportionality should be the most important principle applied to
all discovery,"90 and "there should be early disclosure of prospective
trial witnesses,"91 to "discovery should not be used for enabling a
party to see whether or not a valid claim exists."92
In a rising tide of law review articles exploring the options for
easing the costs and burdens of e-discovery, scholars have proposed:
* "[p]ostpon[ing] the discovery until after summary
judgment";93
* aggressive use of technology to "improve the efficiency of
the discovery process";94
* that litigants become better versed at "articulating in
plain English the unique burdens involved in locating
and producing ESI"95 and "invoke[e] FRCP 1 as a basis
87. Id. (quoting Robert G. Bone, Who Decides?: A Critical Look at Procedural
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961 (2007)).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 91.
90. FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 7. See also id. at 14 ("Electronic discovery
should be limited by proportionality, taking into account the nature and scope of the
case, relevance, importance to the court's adjudication, expense and burdens.").
91. Id. at 14.
92. Id. at 17.

93. Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better:
The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 954
(2009).

94. See Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FCRP 1: Creative Approaches to Cutting
and Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L.

&TECH.
95.

11,

174 (2007).

Id. T 175.
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for the innovative use of search strategies and costshifting to increase efficiency and reduce costs across the
board in discovery";96
* that judges and litigators should be "encouraged to
attend technical workshops where they can obtain a full
understanding of the complexity of the electronic storage
and retrieval of documents."97
Like medical reform suggestions to the effect that "waste and
fraud should be reduced," many of these scholarly proposals would
doubtless be beneficial if they could be implemented. This article
argues, however, that more concrete solutions to the e-discovery
crisis will be required to truly open the American courts to those who
most need judicial redress.
Several groups representing the defense bar recently presented a
white paper at the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation at Duke Law
School.98 Not surprisingly, the groups' paper proposed that "[a] party
submitting a request for discovery [be] required to pay the reasonable
costs incurred by a party responding to a discovery request."99 They
argue that this proposal would (1) "encourage[] parties to self-police
discovery";100 (2) reduce the incentive "to make overly broad requests
without consequence and to impose cost and burden on an adversary
to increase the chances of resolving the case without regard to ability
to prove the merits";101 and (3) encourage "cooperation among
litigants to avoid disputes and to promote efficient discovery."102
While these arguments are compelling, and might finally
constrain the costs of discovery, they are unrealistic because they will
inevitably be perceived as favoring defendants too strongly; thus,

96. Id. 1 176.
97. FINAL REPORT, supra note 36, at 15.
98. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., WHITE PAPER: RESHAPING THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 22-23 (May 2, 2010), available at
2
http://www.dri.org/ContentDirectory/Public/CommitteeDoes/0440/Reshaping%20the%
(noting
ORules%20of%20Civil%2OProcedure%20for%20the%2021st%20Century.pdf
that "[tlhe 2006 amendments . . . did not eliminate the driving forces behind the
decades-long effort to identify an appropriate and manageable scope of discovery,
namely discovery abuse, misuse and unnecessary expense") [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER].
99. Id. at 56.
100. Id. at 59 ("The current approach allows the requesting party to make overly
broad requests without consequence and to impose cost and burden on an adversary to
increase the chances of resolving the case without regard to ability to prove the
merits.").
101. Id. at 59-60.
102. Id. at 60 ("A requester-pays rule would strongly encourage cooperation. Such a
rule gives both parties an incentive to work together to obtain discovery needed to
resolve the merits of the case in the cheapest, quickest way possible.").
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these proposals have little practical chance of adoption. Accordingly,
this article argues that, although Rule 26(b) favors plaintiffs, and the
position advocated by the white paper favors defendants, a
reasonable compromise would be to share the costs of production.
Indeed, Professor Nicola Sharpe recently made a compelling case for
a mandatory 50/50 allocation of discovery costs in complex civil
litigation between corporate entities.103 Sharpe observes that
amended Rule 26(b)'s reliance on judicial discretion has failed to
reduce the cost of discovery:
Under the current rules, in which the party responding to a
discovery request bears the cost of compliance, corporate litigants
are subjected to potentially frivolous and overly broad discovery
requests by opportunistic opponents because the party requesting
discovery is able to externalize the cost of compliance. Such
opponents may then extract settlement values that exceed the
expected value of a judgment in their favor.104
Stated in more basic terms, Sharpe's point is that there is a
natural human tendency toward frugality and reasonableness when
one has to contribute to the cost of what is desired. Like a child who
screams, throws a fit, and demands that her mother buy her a doll,
but then reflects cautiously on whether she really wants the doll
when told she can have the doll only if she pays for half of it with her
allowance, a litigant who knows that he will be responsible for half
the cost of any ESI he demands will be more circumspect and
rational in deciding on what he really has to have.

C. Proposed Solution
This Article contends that Professor Sharpe's proposal is sound,
but does not go far enough. Indeed, the rapid increase in the amount
of information available for litigants during discovery exposes the
problems underlying our simple presumption that the producing
party should pay the costs for production. The rapidly increasing
scope and cost of e-discovery increases the possibility that a plaintiff
with weak claims will nonetheless be able to use the discovery
process as leverage to obtain a settlement in excess of the plaintiffs
claims' value because the defendant wishes to avoid an expensive
discovery process that will be unavoidable if the case proceeds to
litigation.os Similarly, it also creates the possibility that either party
will prolong the discovery process to create leverage to encourage

103.
104.

Sharpe, supra note 55, at 113-14.
Id. at 112.

105.

See Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73

IND. L.J. 59, 74 (1997) (arguing that a party can improve its position by making
"burdensome discovery requests').
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settlement.106 It encourages counsel for both parties to conduct the
most thorough search possible for their clients under their
professional obligation of zealous representation,107 even when the
costs of the search far exceed the value of the evidence to either
party.108 It also allows parties to "treasure hunt" for additional claims
because the underlying data is richer and more complete than ever
before.109 The proper role of discovery is simply to allow a party to
obtain evidence relevant to its claims,1o and, therefore, this article
argues that the discovery process must be modified to curb these
abuses."n
Moreover, the 2006 amendments to Rule 26, which are discussed
in Part I.D and Part III, have failed to significantly reduce the cost or
scope of litigation.112 Therefore, it is time to expand Sharpe's proposal

106. See id.; Toshiba Am. Elec. Components, Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr.
3d, 532, 539-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2004) ("A lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence . .. in representing a client.").

108.

Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform,

27 GA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1992) ("Lawyers may thus regard themselves as both ethically
and professionally bound to take advantage of whatever procedural opportunities are
available to them, with the unfortunate result of discovery practices that seem
designed to intimidate as much as to discover."); FINAL REPORT, supranote 36, at 7.
109. See Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L.
REV. 321, 322-23 (2008) (keynote address given at the University of Baltimore Law
Review Symposium on March 13, 2008) (comparing e-mail to the "corporate equivalent
of DNA" and observing that it captures more information than would have been
written down before e-mail became commonplace); SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48,
at 44-45 (observing that a variety of information sources are stored when created
digitally, including intermediate drafts of documents and virtual conferences).
28 ("The 1938 switch to notice pleading and
110. Paul & Baron, supra note 38,
liberal discovery was intended to ensure cases would be decided on the merits - by
allowing full disclosure of the pertinent facts prior to trial, thereby avoiding unfair
surprise.").
111. These abuses are even less justifiable when imposed on a non-party. When a
party to litigation requests discovery from a non-party, this poses an unexpected and
often undeserved burden on the non-party producer. In spite of this, the producer must
still bear the costs, and the parties to the litigation have little or no incentive to control
the scope of their requests to the non-party. See Marcus, supra, note 109, at 333
(describing how lawyers use discovery to obtain a local transit authority's data to show
where an opposing party was at a specific time). While this information might be
relevant, its production entails a cost to the transit authority without any reciprocal
benefit. See also In Re: Fannie Mae Sec. Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(describing litigation in which a non-party government office expended $6 million,
amounting to nine percent of the agency's annual budget, but failed to fully satisfy ediscovery requests for archived e-mail messages).
112. WHITE PAPER, supra note 98, at 22-23 ("The 2006 amendments . . . did not
eliminate the driving forces behind the decades-long effort to identify an appropriate
and manageable scope of discovery, namely discover abuse, misuse and unnecessary
expense.").

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

540

[Vol. 63:2

for 50/50 cost-sharing to all civil cases and to all types of discoveryand especially e-discovery. Only a fundamental reform like this can
truly stem the skyrocketing costs of discovery, and open the courts of
justice to that large segment of the American public currently
excluded.
This Article continues with an overview of the origins of
discovery and shows that the "producer-pays" presumption is
premised on the notion that full disclosure would speed along the
inexpensive resolution of cases and could be adequately controlled
through judicial supervision. Part I explains the development of the
"producer-pays" presumption and the reluctance among federal
courts to order that the requesting party participate in paying for
discovery. Part II discusses how the technological environment of
discovery has shattered the practical realities that formerly
constrained the scope and costs of the discovery process. Part III
shows how the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have not only failed to cabin the cost and scope of discovery, but
actually encourage litigation ancillary to the merits of the case.
Finally, Part IV briefly examines the discovery rules of states and
foreign countries that reject the "producer-pays" presumption, and
shows that a functional civil justice system need not adopt the
"producer-pays" presumption.
I.

THE HISTORY OF DISCOVERY

Although the presumption of vast civil discovery did not exist in
early English courts, early American courts encouraged discovery.113
The "precursor[s] [of] modern pretrial discovery" can be found in the
English equity courts.114 These courts, also known as Courts of
Chancery,115 allowed pretrial discovery mainly for plaintiffs to an
action and to defendants who filed a crossbill.116 In these courts,
beginning in the 16th century, the chancellor would compel the
defendant personally to come before him to answer, under oath, each
sentence of the petitioner's bill or complaint.117 The defendant would
113.

Subrin, supranote 69, at 918-22 (discussing history of equity procedure).

114. Id. at 919.
115. Id. at 914.
116. ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 201, 203 (1952) (describing the reasoning for this as
"emanation of the royal authority"); see also ALBERT PUTNEY, POPULAR LAW LIBRARY

(1908) (defining "cross bill" as when the "defendant in equity files a cross bill for
discovery only against the plaintiff in the original bill, the defendant to the original
bill shall first answer thereto before the original plaintiff shall be compellable to
answer the cross bill. The answer of the original plaintiff to such cross bill may be read
and used by the party filing the cross bill at the heading, in the same manner and
under the same restrictions as the answer praying relief may now be read and used').
117.

MILIAR, supra note 116, at 204 (noting that the method of appearing was both
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be compelled to answer questions that were attached to the bill.118
The equity court would then rely on these answers in lieu of
testimony in open court.119 The only way that a defendant in
chancery could obtain any form of discovery from the plaintiff was by
using a cross-bill; in effect, the defendant needed to begin a new
proceeding, and this required authorization from the crown. 120
Thus, the equity court would grant pre-trial discovery to aid the
plaintiff in his or her claim for substantive relief falling within the
Court's particular jurisdiction.121 The equity court could also grant
discovery as an aid to the proceedings elsewhere.122 For example, a
party in an action at common law could exhibit a bill in the Court of
Chancery for the purpose of discovery material evidence to be used in
the trial of their existing common law action. 123
In contrast to this factfinding procedure in the equity courts,
there was virtually no means of discovery available in the common
law system.124 Beginning in the 1200s, propositions to be answered
by the adversary under oath were attached to complaints to serve as
both a statement of claim and position of the plaintiff.125 Although
somewhat reminiscent of the modern interrogatory, this position
statement was the closest device to modern discovery available to
parties in a common law action.126 These parties though could, at
their option, file a bill in the equity court for the purpose of
complicated and expensive, parallel to the current method); Subrin, supra note 69, at
919 ("The Chancellor, however, compelled the defendant personally to come before him
to answer under oath each sentence of the petitioner's bill."). See also P. Tucker, The
Early History of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study, 115 THE ENGLISH
HISTORIcAL REVIEW 791, 801-06 (2000) (explaining the increase in judicial activity and
the bulk of the workload was concerned with equitable cases).
118. MILLAR, supra note 116, at 203 (explaining further that denial in an answer
could only be defeated with testimony of two witnesses or "equal quantum of proof" by
one witness and supporting circumstances); Subrin, supra note 69, at 919.
119. MILLAR, supra note 116, at 204 (explaining that the purpose of the bill was to
obtain discovery and an equity court would exhibit the bill to use in trial).
120. Id. at 203 (describing cross-bill as "in effect the institution of a new
proceeding").
121. Id. at 204 (explaining further the role the bills played in discovery and how it
related to each party).
122. Id. (describing that the sole purpose of these bills was for either side to obtain
discovery).
123. Id. (explaining process of the bill; namely, answer did not provide this double
character situation when no claim for substantive relief exists).
124. Id. (describing that reform of this complicated, expensive system began by
extending common-law courts the power to compel discovery).
125. Id. at 201 (explaining that this classic system of discovery facts was patterned
after affirmative propositions that were answered by an adversary under oath).
126. Id. at 202 (describing the system including interrogating part, which first
appeared toward the end of the seventeenth century and consisted of "specific
interrogatories addressed to the defendant").
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discovering material evidence to aid in the trying of their action at
common law.127

A.

American Discovery

Reform of the English discovery process began as early as 1800
in the new states.128 In 1800, South Carolina allowed common law
courts to compel discovery in minor causes of action.129 Kentucky
followed by allowing justices of the peace to compel discovery in
1809.130 Discovery emerged as a feature of the ordinary common law
practice in Mississippi for the first time in 1828.131 Mississippi
allowed for a petition under oath that called for an order of discovery
to follow in writing.132 Refusal to follow the discovery order would
result in an admission of the facts in relation to which discovery was
sought.13s

Other states proceeded to the common use of interrogatories in
common law actions; Virginia, for instance, enacted a statute
permitting the interrogatory in 1831.134 This statute provided for the
filings of interrogatories by both parties and for an order to answer
such interrogatories, as long as they were material, pertinent, and of
such character that the interrogated party would be bound to answer
them on a bill in an equity court. 135 If a defendant failed to answer
the interrogatory, a default judgment would be entered against him;
when plaintiff failed to answer, the action would be dismissed.136
However, the introduction of the oral examination or deposition in
the New York Code of 1848 radically changed the pre-trial discovery
practices of the early American states. 137

127. Id. at 204 (describing that the sole purpose of the bill was to gain discovery and
"either party to an action in a common-law court might exhibit a bill in the Court of
Chancery for the purpose of discovering material evidence to be used in the trial of
that common-law action").
128. Id. (stating that it was America, not England, that started the reform and it
began with extending power to compel discovery to common law courts).

129. Id. See also Robert Wyness Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil
Procedure, 38 YALE L.J. 193, 197-200 (1928) (discussing the legislative basis of what
came to be known as the South Carolina 'summary process"').
130. MILIAR, supra note 116, at 204-05 (describing the course of reform throughout
the individual states).
131. Id. at 205 (discussing the start of the adoption of the petition process).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 206.
137. Id. at 211.
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B. The Field Code of 1848 and the FederalEquity Rules
The primary goal of the New York Code of 1848, known as the
Field Code, was predictability. as The Field Code provided for some
pretrial discoveryl39 and permitted the court to grant a plaintiff 'any
relief consistent with the case made by the complaint, and embraced
within the issue."'140 The Field Code attempted to reduce the amount
of documentation prevalent in the equity courts and in the early
common law discovery mechanisms modeled after those courts.141
The Field Code also eliminated equitable bills of discovery and
the interrogatories that were part of the equitable bill.142 The code
included no interrogatory provisions, motions to produce documents
were severely limited, and pretrial depositions were to be before a
judge who would rule on evidence objections and were used in lieu of
calling a party at trial.143 The code was ultimately adopted in more
than half of the states.144
Later, under the revised Federal Equity Rules of 1912, the
equitable bill of complaint no longer contained charges of evidence or
interrogatories.145 Under these rules, after filing a pleading, either
party had the opportunity to file written interrogatories or requests
for documents material to the support or defense of the cause.146
Answers to these interrogatories were made under oath, and parties

138. Subrin, supra note 69, at 934-35 ("The major goal of the Field Code was to
facilitate the swift, economic, and predictable enforcement of discrete, carefully
articulated rights."); see also George W. Wickersham, The New York PracticeAct, 29
YALE L.J. 904, 904 (1920) (discussing the origination of the Code, which was "drawn by
David Dudley Field, and adopted in 1848, which furnished a model for almost all of the
other states of the Union, had grown to such dimensions as to constitute a voluminous,
intricate and inelastic system of civil practice in our courts, which involved great
expense to litigants, and too frequently led to the merits of the controversies being
entirely obscured by question of mere procedure").
139. Subrin, supra note 30, at 696.
140. Subrin, supra note 69, at 934 (quoting N.Y. COMM'RS ON PLEADINGS, THE FIRST
REPORT OF THE (NEW YORK) COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE & PLEADING 139 (1848). For
background on Field's motivations to create the Field Code, see generally SPEECHES,
ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD (1884).
141. Subrin, supranote 69, at 936; Subrin, supranote 30, at 696.
142. Subrin, supra note 69, at 936; Subrin, supra note 30, at 696.
143. Subrin, supra note 69, at 937; see also NAT'L AMERICANA Soc'Y, 1 LEGAL AND
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 439-42 (Alden Chester ed. 1911) (examining the
history of the development of uniform legal standards and codes in New York).
144. Subrin, supra note 69, at 939; see also MILLAR, supra note 116, at 204-06
(discussing the new pattern for procedural legislation that spread across the country);
Subrin, supra note 30 at 696.
145. MILLAR, supra note 116, at 212 (noting that the newly adopted method was
patterned directly on the English Rules).
146. Id. at 212.
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could file written objections before being required to answer. 147

C. The FederalRules of Civil Procedure
The Rules Enabling Actl48 granted the Supreme Court the power
to prescribe rules regarding the general process and procedure of civil
actions at law.149 The act limited this power, however, to issuing
rules that did not abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights
of the litigants.150 This Act allowed the Supreme Court to draft the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.151
Unlike the Field Code, which severely limited discovery, the
Federal Rules embraced broad discovery.152 The rules promote full
disclosure: Rule 26 makes all information relevant to the subject
matter of an action discoverable, absent a valid privilege.153 Although
the members of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee were initially
concerned about replacing in-court testimony with discovery devices
because of distant memories of the unwieldy documentation of the
equity system, 154 the committee rejected proposals to limit
discovery.155 The committee felt that the final discovery rules,
summary judgment process, and pretrial conference provisions would
limit the scope of disputes and eliminate frivolous issues and
claims.156

More recently, concern about the lenience of the rules' discovery
practices has led to amendments further controlling discovery.157 In
1980, an amendment was added which allowed for discovery
conferencesiss and in 1983, amendments were made "relating to

147. Id. at 213 (describing also that with this adoption also came a "re-regulation of
fact-discovery . .. definitely revealing a discriminating assay of the past
development").
148. Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See MILLAR, supra note 116, at 61-62.
152. Subrin, supra note 69, at 977.
153. Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil
Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 785-86 (1998). See also MILLAR, supra note 116, at 21415 (discussing Rule 26(b) in greater detail and noting that "it is not ground for
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"). See
FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
154. Subrin, supra note 69, at 978; see also MILLAR, supra note 116, at 214-15
(noting that its faults opened a new era of civil procedure).
155. Subrin, supra note 69, at 977.
156. Id. at 979.
157. Id. at 984.
158. Id.
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pretrial conference and the attorney's certification on motions,
pleadings, and discovery."159
Although members of the Advisory Committee were concerned
with the possibility for overly burdensome discovery,160 ultimately
the Federal Rules allowed for expansive discovery with practices and
principles originally drawn from the English courts of equity. 161

D. The 2006 FederalRule Amendments
Changes in technology forced the Federal Rules to evolve.
Amendments dealing specifically with the challenges of discovery of
electronically stored information went into effect on December 1,
2006.162 The discovery conference required under Rule 26(f) must
now include discussion of issues related to electronic discovery.163
This includes discussion of whether ESI will be requested, in what
form it will be requested, whether originals or only backups are
available, and the expected media and format for the production of
this information.164 Decisions regarding the cost of discovering the
material and a schedule for discovery should be made at this
conference as well.165 The pretrial conference contemplated under
Rule 16 allows for parties to "discuss and memorialize the
agreements" as well as giving the parties an opportunity to seek
judicial resolution of discovery disputes. 166
The 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules also included other
provisions intended to help parties manage the costs and burdens of
e-discovery. First, Rule 34(a) makes it clear that the producing party
159. Id.; see also MILLAR, supra note 116, at 214 (explaining that when an attorney
completed a deposition, it was filed in a sealed envelope with the clerk of the court).
160. Subrin, supra note 69, at 979.
161. Id. at 922.
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii), 34(a)(1)(A); Vlad J. Kroll, Default Production of
Electronically Stored Information Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The
Requirements of Rule 34(b), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 221 (2007). See also Ryan Horning
et al., The Law & Technology: Electronic Discovery: The New Rules, 20 CBA RECORD
51, 51 (2006).
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3)(C).
164. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 4-5 (2007), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookupleldscpkt.pdf/$file/eldscpkt.pdf (urging judges
to make sure that a "meaningful . . . conference take place" between the parties and
that the conference should include "what information each party has in electronic form
and where that information resides; whether the information to be discovered has been
deleted or is available only on backup tapes or legacy systems; the anticipated
schedule for production and the format and media of that production; the difficulty and
cost of producing the information and reallocation of costs, if appropriate; and the
responsibilities of each party to preserve ESr).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 5.
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has an obligation to translate ESI into "reasonably usable form"
when necessary, but Rule 34(b) also allows a producer to object to the
form in which ESI is requested.167 Next, the amendments included
the new "two-tier" discovery provisions in Rule 26(b)(2)(B), which
encourages parties to seek discovery from more easily-accessed
sources rather than sources that are more costly and difficult to
access.168 Finally, the rules included a safe harbor provision
protecting parties who cannot provide ESI "as a result of the routine,
good-faith operation of an electronic information system," which was
enacted as Rule 37(f), but is now part of Rule 37(e).169

II. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF E-DISCOVERY
E-discovery170 poses significant technological problems of scale,
accessibility, search capability, and form of production. There are
three key problems relating to the storage and production of
electronically stored information that contribute to making ediscovery expensive, and, in many cases, disproportionately so. First,
technology allows us to create, transmit, and store vastly more
information than ever before. Second, the available technological
tools for searching through this vast quantity of information are
poorly adapted to fully and accurately searching through all of the
kinds of information that we generate. And, third, some data is
extraordinarily difficult or impossible to effectively search.
A.

Problems of Scale

This Article has already hinted at the problems of scale
associated with e-discovery. By itself, e-mail is a major driver of the
scale of e-discovery.171 Close to 100 billion e-mail messages are sent
each day.172 That is about 14 messages every day for every human

167. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a)(1)(A), (b)(2)(B).
168. See infra Part III.B.
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e); see also infra, Part III.C.3.
170. E-discovery is merely the traditional discovery process described in Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as applied to the disclosure from ESI. See, e.g.,
Marcus, supra note 109, at 321-22, 332. Some question the usefulness of the "ediscovery" moniker, but we use it here because of its usefulness in contrasting
discovery of hardcopy documents with discovery of ESI, particularly because of the
characteristic problems related to the storage, search, and production of ESI that we
describe in this section.
171. See Fios, INC., E-DISCOVERY TRENDS AND PERSPECTIVES: A CONVERSATION
WITH CORPORATE COUNSEL 4 (2008), available at http://www.fiosinc.comle-discoveryknowledge-center/electronic-discovery-whitepaper.aspx?id=341 (indicating that survey
respondents indicated e-mail management was second only to legal hold oversight in
their concerns about e-discovery).
172. Paul & Baron, supra note 38, 12.
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being living on Earth.173 Federal agencies alone create or receive 30
billion messages each year. 174 And, in 2007, the average U.S. worker
sent or received 100 e-mail messages daily.175
George L. Paul and Jason R. Baron176 describe the difficulties
attendant to searching 18 million e-mails from the presidential
records office associated with tobacco litigation:
For the 18 million presidential record e-mails . .. the search
process found . .. 200,000 'hits,' of which over 100,000 were later
determined to be responsive.... In undertaking a second-stage
manual search to determine responsiveness, it was necessary to
[use] a team of twenty-five lawyers, law clerks, and archivists ...
full time over a period of six months.177
They go on to explain that if the body of potentially responsive
documents to a discovery request grew to one billion documents, even
under favorable assumptions about how many documents a person
can review each day, and using computers to aid in the initial search,
review of the potentially responsive documents would still take 100
people 28 weeks to complete and cost at least $20 million.178 This is
not an unreasonable example, either; the number of e-mails held in
corporate databases is increasing exponentially. 179
The exponential growth of stored digital information is not
confined to e-mail. It extends to all other kinds of digitally stored
information. Between "2004 to 2007, the average amount of data in a
Fortune 1000 corporation grew from 190 terabytes to one thousand
terabytes."so Similarly, "the average data sets at 9,000 American,
midsize companies grew from two terabytes to 100 terabytes."181 This
100 terabyte data set, if printed out, would produce a stack of paper
20,000 miles high. 182 Astoundingly, the hardware needed to store this

173. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, about 6.9 billion people were living on
Earth as of November 1, 2010. World POPClock Projection, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/popclockworld.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
174. Paul & Baron, supra note 38, 12.
175. The Sedona Conference WG1, The Sedona Conference Best Practices

Commentary on the Use of Search and InformationRetrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8
SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 198 (2007) [hereinafter Search Methods].
176. "George L. Paul is a partner in Lewis and Roca, LLP, and is a graduate of
Dartmouth College (1979) and Yale Law School (1982). ... Jason R. Baron is Director
of Litigation at the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park,
Maryland, and is a graduate of Wesleyan University (1977) and Boston University
School of Law (1980)." Paul & Baron, supra note 49, at nn.* & *.
177. Paul & Baron, supra note 38, 17.
178. Id. at 1 20.
179. See id.
180. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 41.
181. Id.
182. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 61, at 1-2. Dertouzos explains that 1 terabyte of
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100 terabyte data set would only cost $100,000, but the cost to review
this much information for relevance would be at least $3.2 billion.183
And this is for an average data set in 2007 184

B.

The Search Problem

E-discovery forces potential litigants to painstakingly sort
through these ever-increasing data stores to find information that is
relevant to a dispute or an anticipated dispute. Producers face
significant challenges in searching through their information. The
traditional method of searching-keyword searches-is often too
blunt and error-prone to be truly reliable.185 While newer search
technologies are being developed, these technologies are expensive to
set up and use.186 Further, a wide variety of non-textual data is
simply not keyword searchable. 187 Finally, regardless of the method a
producer selects, the producer must be prepared to face challenges to
the thoroughness of the search.188 Compared to yesteryear, these
tasks can be monumental.
Indeed, lawyers seem to collectively recall a simpler time when
the documents that were relevant to requests for production could
easily be found in a file cabinet or box that a lawyer or paralegal
could manually review accurately and quickly.189 This halcyon notion
is misleading, however. In a 1985 study, researchers found that
people are not especially good at manually locating responsive paper
documents from a larger body of potentially responsive paper
documents.190 In the study, lawyers reviewed 40,000 documents
information would, if printed, would produce "a 200-mile-high stack of paper." Id. By
comparison, note that the diameter of the Earth is just under 8,000 miles. Earth
Closing in on Sun - But Don't Panic, CBSNEws.coM, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2011/01/03/tech/main7209119.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). Most of us only feel
like we have this much work.
183. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 198 n.13 (observing that a gigabyte of data
costs $1 to store and $32,000 to review). Since a terabyte is about 1,000 gigabytes, a
100 terabyte data set would be 100,000 gigabytes.
184. Exacerbating the problem is the need to conduct a privilege review of
documents already reviewed for responsiveness. See generally John M. Facciola,

Sailing on Confused Seas: Privilege Waiver and the New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 2006 FED. CTs. L. REV. 6 (2006); Jessica Wang, Comment, Nonwaiver

Agreements after Federal Rule of Evidence 502: A Glance at Quick-Peek and Clawback
Agreements, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1835, 1839-40 (2009); Committee note 2 to FED. R. EVID.
502; SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 500-01.
185. See infra Part H.B.
186. See infra Part I.B.
187. See infra Part IID.

188. See infra Part II.C.
189. See, e.g., Search Methods, supra note 175, at 198; Paul & Baron, supra note 38,
at f 13.

190. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 206.
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totaling 350,000 pages for responsiveness to a discovery request.191
The lawyers thought they had found about 75% of the relevant
documents, but in fact they found only about 20% of the responsive
documents.192 Nonetheless, courts and litigants appear to think that
producers can accurately search huge databases of electronic
documents both for responsiveness and for privilege review.193
Because of this, electronic discovery may actually raise the standards
of completeness in discovery beyond what was historically required
in searches of hardcopy documents in paper files. This exacerbates
the costs associated with crafting, executing, and justifying the
reliability of the search protocol.
The primary method that producers use to search through their
data is the keyword search.194 The paradigmatic example of
searching in e-discovery is conducting a keyword search for
responsive e-mails. E-mail correspondence is often crucial to
establish facts in litigation.195 But, because of the massive amounts of
correspondence stored in e-mail systems, producers must rely on
automated methods to search through the database of stored
messages to find documents responsive to a discovery request.196
Often, this process begins with a familiar keyword search that is
conceptually similar to the searches that lawyers perform in online
legal databases like Westlaw and LexisNexis.197 The keyword search
is likely to be a process of iterative refinement until the producer
feels that the keyword search has produced the best set of results
possible.198 Then, if practical, humans may review the results
manually to further ensure that the documents are responsive and to
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 199; see also Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc, 250 F.R.D. 251,
256-57 (D. Md. 2008) (concluding a party's keyword review was inadequate to preserve
privilege because the party failed to perform a quality control step to validate the
keyword search). Perhaps the Victor Stanley court was correct, but the apparent goal
is to ensure that the search is not overinclusive or underinclusive. If the science is to
be believed, this would have been an unrealistic goal with a manual search of paper
documents, and will remain unrealistic even with searches of digital information.
194. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 200 ("By far the most commonly used
search methodology today is the use of 'keyword searches' of full text and metadata as
a means of filtering data for producing responsive documents in civil discovery.").

195. See R. Scott Simon, Searching For Confidentiality In Cyberspace: Responsible
Use of E-Mail for Attorney-Client Communications,20 U. HAW. L. REv. 527, 531 & n.17
(1998) ("Now that practitioners have discovered that discovery of e-mail can be a 'gold
mine-or a nightmare,' e-mail messages are appearing more frequently in litigation
and playing a part in court decisions."); Paul & Baron, supranote 38,
14-20.
196. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 200.
197. Id. at 197.
198. See Mazza et al., supra note 94, 11 77-78 (noting that litigants are beginning to
use sampling techniques to "validate proposed keywords").
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filter out any privileged documents.
Unfortunately, keyword searches are not always reliable. While
keyword searches may be quite effective when searching for
messages and other documents containing a proper name, in other
contexts, the reliability of keyword searches can vary.199 Indeed,
courts are increasingly skeptical of the adequacy of keyword-driven
production.200 Some search problems stem from words with multiple
meanings, the use of unanticipated words and abbreviations, and
typographical errors within the set of documents to be searched.201
For instance, the word "strike" has multiple meanings: it describes a
labor walkout, an options trading tactic, a military action, as well as
having sport-related meanings.202 Therefore, a search involving the
term "strike" would tend to be overinclusive.203 Conversely, a
message or other document referring to a strike as an "OLW"-an
"organized labor walkout"-would not be included in the search
results because it does not contain the keyword.204 The search would
also fail to include messages that misspelled "strike."205
The risk of misspelling is particularly acute when searching
scanned documents, because optical character recognition ("OCR")the technology that translates the image of a scanned document into
searchable text-is not entirely reliable.206 The actual reliability of
scanned text can vary considerably with the quality of the original,
the typeface of the original, the care taken during scanning, the
scanning method, and the quality of the OCR software itself.207 In
one experiment, the average per-character accuracy rate for bitonal
(black and white) images was about 97.5 percent, meaning that
errors occurred in 25 out of each 1000 characters.208 Because words
tend to have five characters on average, this results in an error in

199. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 201.
200. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 256-57 (D.
Md. 2008).
201. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 201.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 202-03.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See generally Tracy Powell & Gordon Paynter, Going Grey? Comparing the
OCR Accuracy Levels of Bitonal and Greyscale Images, D-LIB MAGAZINE (Mar./Apr.
2009), available at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/march09/powell/03powell.html (performing
experiments on OCR accuracy and obtaining accuracy levels ranging from 88.6 percent

to 98.2 percent); Rose Holley, How Good Can It Get? Analysing and Improving OCR
Accuracy in Large Scale HistoricNewspaper DigitisationPrograms, D-LIB MAGAZINE
(Mar./Apr. 2009), available at http://www.dlib.org/dlib/march09/holley/03holley.html
(Mar./Apr. 2009).
208. Powell & Paynter, supra note 207.
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125 of each 1000 words.209 Presumably, OCR errors are even more
likely with proper names, because OCR software uses dictionaries of
words to improve accuracy, but proper names would generally not
appear in these dictionaries.210
Courts are beginning to take notice of the problems attendant to
keyword searches. One judge wrote, "[A]ll keyword searches are not
created equal; and there is a growing body of literature that
highlights the risks associated with conducting an unreliable or
inadequate keyword search. .. ."211 Now, producers may be expected
to use a technique of sampling the documents that a particular
keyword search produces to determine whether the keyword search
is accurate. 212 Thus, a producer would be required to compose a
keyword search to sift through the potentially responsive documents,
and then manually review the results to verify whether the search is
over-inclusive or under-inclusive.213 If So, the producer would refine
the keyword search and begin again. While there is no required
threshold of reliability, the producer must "arrive at a comfort level"
that the keyword search is reliable.214
Because keyword search results can be both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive, emerging technologies enable producers to engage in
a more sophisticated search of a set of documents. These technologies
allow a computer to use learning techniques, contextual cues, and
synonym databases to distinguish responsive documents from the
rest. 215 Some of these technologies are also able to assign scores to
potentially responsive documents to indicate the likelihood of a
match, which allows parties to prioritize review of those documents
which are most clearly responsive.216 These technologies can be used
209.

Karen Kukich, Techniques for Automatically Correcting Words in Text, 24 ACM

COMPUTING SURVEYS 377, 378 (1992), available at http://portal.acm.org/citation
.cfm?doid=146370.146380. Assuming that words of interest to parties in litigation are
generally longer than some of the shorter articles and conjunctions that regularly
appear in colloquial speech, we can assume the error rate would in fact be higher for
search terms relevant to litigation.
210. See id. at 383-84 (discussing the challenges of using dictionaries to improve
text recognition accuracy).
211. Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 256-57 (D. Md.
2008).
212. Id. at 257.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 202-03, 207-08; Mazza et al., supra note 94,
54-57.
216. The Grumpy Editor's Guide to Bayesian Spam Filters, LWN.NET (Feb. 22,
2006), http://lwn.net/Articles/172491/. The article discusses spam filtering of e-mail,
but the problem of filtering legitimate messages from undesired messages is
conceptually the same as filtering any kind of responsive document from a body of
documents.
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both to identify potentially responsive documents as well as to
attempt to identify privileged documents within the set of responsive
documents.217 However, these advanced, emerging search
technologies are unlikely to significantly reduce the costs of ediscovery. First, these technologies can be expensive and timeconsuming to set up and validate compared to keyword searching.218
Indeed, these costs can be significant enough that the best
technologies may not be suited to satisfying smaller requests for
production.219 Further, because lawyers (and judges) may not fully
understand these technologies, they may not be comfortable relying
on the results.220 And, because these technologies are newer and less
well-understood, parties must expect to work even harder to convince
courts and opposing parties of the reliability of the search.221

C. Supporting the Search Protocol
Regardless of the method a producer uses to search through its
information, the producer must also confront additional costly
burdens. The producer must either negotiate an appropriate search
protocol or procedure with the requesting party or, if negotiation fails
to yield a mutually acceptable protocol, the producer must be
prepared to defend the sufficiency of its production efforts.222 A
producer may even need to engage experts to construct proper search
terms, and these experts must also be able to credibly testify that
the search terms [were] properly constructed" and produced accurate
results.223 Producers who do not engage costly experts risk that a
court will order further searches, driving up the expense and
increasing the delay of discovery.224 As one group of experts noted,
"The key to defensibility is that litigants deploy these search
strategies as part of a reasonable, good-faith, well-documented
discovery protocol. Lawyers must . . . have confidence that they have
taken measures to ensure the quality of their searches."225 Because
producers must be prepared to defend their search protocols against
motions to compel further discovery, producers must incur the costs

217. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 203.
218. Id. at 203 n.29. But see Mazza et al., supra note 94, $ 5 (claiming that these
search technologies may reduce discovery costs).
219. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 203 n.29.
220. Id. at 203.
221. Id.
222. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 212; see e.g., In re CV Therapeutics, Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. C-03-3709 SI, 2006 WL 2458720, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2006)

(requiring producer to disclose search terms for testing).
223. Mazza et al., supra note 94, $ 51.
224. Id.
225.

Id.

68 (emphasis added).

2011]

E-DISCOVERY'S THREAT TO CIVIL LITIGATION

553

to prepare records justifying and explaining their procedures,
because producers will never know in advance whether they will
need to defend these methods.226
D. ProblemsInherent in Data
Unfortunately for producers, the e-discovery problems that drive
up the cost and duration of litigation are not confined merely to the
methods and procedures used to search for responsive information.
They also stem from the difficulty of searching the various
repositories of data that litigants possess. Many kinds of data can be
difficult or nearly impossible to effectively search.
1. Non-searchable Data
Increasingly, litigants are storing a variety of non-textual data

that computers cannot effectively search. Some organizations, aided
by the transition to voice-over-internet technology, which allows
telephone calls to be transmitted over data networks, have begun

recording a variety of audio communications.227 One frequent use of
this technology is to record calls from call centers and help desks for
quality control and auditing purposes. 228 Another is the storage of
voice mail messages in unified message systems. 229 Organizations are
also beginning to use internet-based cameras to record audio and
video for security purposes. 230 The ease with which cameras can be

connected to an existing data network and the resulting audio and
video stored on a central hard drive has increased the amount of data
that organizations can capture and retain.231 Organizations are also
226. Search Methods, supra note 175, at 212 (noting that attorneys should be
prepared to discuss their search procedures).
227. FIOS, INC., VOICE MAIL AND AUDIO RECORDINGS: EVOLVING F-DISCOVERY
STANDARDS 2, available at http://www.fiosinc.com/e-discovery-knowledge-center/
[hereinafter VOICE MAIL] (last
electronic-discovery-whitepaper-data.aspx?id=127
visited Feb. 25, 2011).
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id. Unified messaging attempts to centralize voice mail, e-mail, and other
kinds of transactional communications into a central mailbox. See Unified Messaging
Definition, PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.comlencyclopedia-term/0,2542,t=unified+
messaging&i=53423, 0O.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); Jason Krause, Law Hacks, 93
A.B.A. J. 36 (2007).
230. AxIs COMMC'Ns, IP-SURVEILLANCE DESIGN GUIDE 3, available at http:/
www.axis.com/files/manuals/gd_ipsurv_design_32568_en_0807lo.pdf (last visited Aug.
29, 2010); Terry Denison & Tony Sivore, Eyes All Around, AM. CITY & COUNTY,
http://americancityandcounty.com/security/facility/co-rec-center-surveillance-system
(last visited Aug. 29, 2010) (describing a project involving the use of eighteen cameras
to maintain security within a municipal recreational facility); Adam Cohen, A
Casualty of the Technology Revolution: 'LocationalPrivacy,' NY TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009,

at A28.
231.

See AXIS COMMC'NS, supra note 230, at 24 ("As larger hard drives are produced
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eager to use this technology because of its low cost relative to
videotapes and the ease with which it can be both stored and
accessed.232
While these technologies offer compelling benefits, they can be
especially troublesome during litigation because their contents
cannot be readily searched using keywords or other automated
methods. While computers can attempt to convert speech to text, so
that computer programs can then search the contents using
keywords, the process is notoriously inaccurate.233 And, even if a
producing party had the people to listen to each audio file that might
be responsive to a discovery request, it can also be difficult for
humans to listen attentively and accurately for any sustained length
of time.234
2.

Backup Tapes and Duplicative Data

Backup tapeS235 and other forms of archival media also represent
potentially significant costs during discovery. Most organizations
make routine backups of important information.236 This backup
process essentially makes copies of data on a schedule.237 Often, data
files are backed up periodically even when they have not changed
since the last backup.238 Backup procedures generally copy changed
data (i.e. files that have changed since the last backup) even more
frequently.239 Not long ago, it was a customary practice for many
organizations to make backups of changed data on a daily basis, and
at lower costs, it is becoming less expensive to store video").
232. See id. at 4-5, 22-24.
233. VOICE MAIL, supra note 227, at 3 n.3 (observing that the very highest accuracy
that can be expected is 85 percent).
234. Id. at 3. Courts, as a result, could have a difficult choice to make when
confronted with documents that should have been but were not disclosed in response
to a discovery request: sanction an innocent producer who failed to identify responsive
documents even though there is simply no reliable way to do so, or to skip the
sanctions, and thereby eliminate a producer's incentive to make a complete effort to
produce all responsive documents. See also Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.,
250 F.R.D. 251, 256 (D. Md. 2008) (describing the shortcuts that litigants must
typically take to determine whether materials that are not keyword searchable are
responsive).
235. Historically, information was often backed up to a magnetic tape. Increasingly,
organizations are relying on arrays of hard disks to house copies of old information.
Computers can copy data to a hard disk can much more rapidly than it can copy a file
to tape. Some organizations then archive the hard disk backups to tape. As a practical
result, the backup is likely to run more often, capturing even more copies of files as
they are changed over time. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 40.
236. Id. at 58.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 60.
239. Id.
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of all data on a weekly basis.240 Migration away from dependence on
magnetic tapes has since made even more frequent backups
possible.241
Typically, organizations reuse their backup tapes according to a
planned rotation, overwriting the data previously stored on the
tape. 242 But, organizations often set aside backup tapes periodically
to allow them to keep an archive of older data.243 This means that
most organizations have a significant number of backup tapes, which
may contain archival copies of the organization's data that could be
several years old.244
Backup information can be quite expensive to search because
generally the information that has been archived is not immediately
accessible for searching, even if the data would be searchable if it
were accessible.245 Generally, the only accessible source of
information about the backup tapes is a backup database. The
backup database contains only an index of the names and basic
attributes of the archived files and the files' locations on the backup
tapes. 246 Since tape reading hardware must read tapes sequentially,
they must read through the entire tape to find a desired file.247 For a
search of the contents of a file to proceed, the file must be restored
from the tape. 248 That means that the file must be copied from the
tape (or other archival medium) to a computer to allow the computer
to search its contents. 249 Put more simply, to actually search the
contents of a backup tape, the tape's contents must first be copied
from the tape to a computer. Therefore, to search a large set of
backup tapes requires that the contents of each tape be copied to a
computer. And, making the process even more laborious and timeconsuming, it can take a significant amount of time for a computer to
read the information stored on a backup tape. 250
240. Id.
241. Id. at 42.
242. Id. at 61.
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 58 (noting that structured backups contain only data about "what
was backed up, when it was backed up, and how it was backed up").
246. See id. at 658.
247. Grant J. Esposito & Thomas M. Mueller, Backup Tapes, You Can't Live With

Them And You Can't Toss Them: Strategies For Dealing with the Litigation Burdens
Associated with Backup Tapes Under the Amended Rules of Civil Procedure, 13
RICHMOND J.L. & TECH. 13, 5-6 (2006).
248. See id. J 5 (quoting Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,
205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting that backup tapes are not organized for
access to individual files).
249. See id.
250. How Long Does it Take to Restore a Tape, EMAG SOLUTIONS,
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Aside from the problem of restoring the contents of backup tapes
to a computer where the data can be searched, backup tapes also
pose a massive redundancy problem. Because the purpose of the
these archives of backup copies is to reduce an organization's
information assets to a portable format that can be used to recover
data in the case of loss,251 an organization's backups will contain
many backups of the same files.252 For the many files that are stored
but never changed, this means an organization may have to sort
through many copies of the same file.253 However, the backup may
also contain different versions of a file that the users changed over
time.254 Although "de-duplication" technology exists that can filter
out duplicates of items that are discovered in a search, the
application of this technology, even though it may create a net
benefit compared to manual search, still imposes an additional time
and cost burden on each search for responsive documents. 255
And, ironically, in spite of all the copies of files that are placed in
backup archives, it is also possible for a file to be created and deleted
before the backup procedure can make an archival copy of it.256
The process of searching through backup tapes is, in fact, so
burdensome that courts have been willing to treat backup tapes as
inaccessible, and to order "sampling" to determine whether the
backup tapes are likely to contain information that could not be
discovered from more readily accessible sources of information.257
"Sampling" entails the restoration of a small representative set of
backup tapes to test whether the backup tapes are likely to contain
enough responsive information that could not be obtained through a
http://www.emaglink.cominewsletter-archive/newsletter_.August_2005.htm
(last
visited Aug. 29, 2010) (describing the time it takes to restore each of several varieties
of backup tapes). Some kinds of low-capacity tapes can be restored in as little as one
hour, but larger tapes can take more than six hours. Id.
251. Esposito & Mueller, supra note 247, T 5.
252. Id. $ 7.
253.
254.
255.
money

Id.
See id.
See Search Methods, supra note 175, at 200. Not only does an organization lose
associated with the time it takes to apply de-duplication, but it must also

expend the money to acquire the technology first. See id. It may also be that this form
of de-duplication may be subject to challenge, especially if the technology actually
allows for slight variance among documents it considers duplicates. See id. at 200 n.16.
As with other steps in e-discovery, the responding party may incur even more costs as
it carefully documents and validates each step in its method so that it can justify its
methods to opposing parties and the court if necessary.
256. Esposito & Mueller, supra note 247, 8.
257. E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(ordering producer to restore any five backup tapes the requesting party selected to
determine whether the contents of the backup tapes justified further production at
producer's expense).
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more easily accessible source so as to justify further production.258
3.

Databases

Searching a database can also be quite difficult because many
databases are stored as a single file or a small number of files.259 Email messages in Microsoft's Exchange e-mail product or data stored
in Microsoft's SQL Server database product, for instance, are all
stored collectively in one large file or a small number of large files.260
Unlike a more accessible data file, such as a Microsoft Word
document, there is no way to directly search these databases.261 The
database cannot simply be opened and the contents of the database
searched on screen from top to bottom. Rather, the database must be
searched using an appropriate "front-end" application. Often, frontend computer programs are written with the ordinary business
needs, rather than litigation, in mind. Therefore, a full search of a
database can necessitate the expensive creation of new software
tools.262 And, in some cases, it can be difficult to search a database
without interfering with the continuing operation of the system,
because of the computational power necessary or the difficulty of
getting a copy of the database restored for discovery purposes to
coexist with the functioning (or "live") version of the database that
the producer uses and relies on in its operations.263
For instance, in Crown Life Insurance,264 a defendant insurance

258. See id.
259. See Understanding Files and Filegroups, MICROSOFT, http://msdn.microsoft
.comlen-us/library/msl89563.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
260. Id.; The Exchange Message Store, MICROSOFT http://technet.microsoft.comlenus/library/bbl25025(EXCHG.65).aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (noting that each
Microsoft Exchange mailbox store-which contains the e-mail messages stored on the
e-mail server-consists of two files, each of which is organized in a different way to
optimize performance). See also Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640,
647 (D. Kan. 2005) (noting that "the database is a completely undifferentiated mass of
tables of data. The metadata is the key to showing the relationships between the data;
without such metadata, the tables of data would have little meaning").
261. See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir. 1993)
(classifying database files as "inaccessible").
262. E.g., Dilley v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 256 F.R.D. 643, 645 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (noting
that searching a database would require "substantial difficulty and expense").
263. Flying J Inc. v. TA Operating Corp., No. 1:06cv00030 TC, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 37180, at *7 (D. Utah May 6, 2008) (claiming that "the processing burden of
querying its system will impair current operations"); see ACRONIS, INC., BACKING UP
AND RESTORING A MICROSOFr@ EXCHANGE ENVIRONMENT 3-4 (2008), available at,
http://www.acronis.com/enterprise/download/does/whitepaper/"f=ARMSExchange-whit
epaper.en.pdf (describing the difficulties inherent in backing up and restoring
Microsoft Exchange Databases).
264. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Craig, 995 F.2d 1376 (7th Cir. 1993).
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company failed to produce the "raw data" directly from a database.265
Crown Life claimed that this data was not accessible.266 Flatly
refusing to even consider that raw data could be inaccessible, the
court held that Crown Life had a duty to make the data available
nonetheless, and, that its failure to do so constituted willful
disobedience of the court's orders to compel.267 The court expected
Crown Life to fashion some method of producing this data.268
This problem is made even more expensive because the results of
the database search must be produced in some logical format to the
requesting party. 269 Although, according to Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(ii),
discovery materials may be produced in the format "in which they
are ordinarily maintained,"270 the producing party must be prepared
to demonstrate that the format of production indeed matches the
format in which the data is ordinarily maintained.271 Because
computer databases are often internally organized in a fashion that
is transparent to the users of the database,272 a producer may need to
employ yet another expensive expert witness to testify about the
internal organization of the producer's databases. Also, in cases when
the requesting party cannot readily perceive or understand the
underlying organization, the producer may have to provide the
requesting party additional information about how the information is
organized during the ordinary course of business.273
In addition, when these database problems are combined with
the problem of backup tapes, it often means that a large and difficultto-search database file must be searched not just once, but once for
each copy of the database that is archived on a backup tape. 274 The
265. Id. at 1378.
266. Id. at 1383.
267. Id.
268. See id. (expecting Crown Life to produce the data because over a year of
discovery had taken place).
269. SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("Under
Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, . . . . [t]he litigant may either produce
documents 'as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label
them to correspond to the categories in the request."') (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
34(b)(2)(E)(ii)).
270. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(ii). See also Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell, Inc.,
255 F.R.D. 331, 337 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (concluding that, even when documents are
produced in the manner in which they are ordinarily maintained, the producer may
still need to provide "at least some modicum of information regarding how they are
ordinarily kept in order to allow the requesting party to make meaningful use of the
documents").
271. Collins & Aikman, 256 F.R.D. at 409.
272. See Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 647 (D. Kan. 2005).
273. Pass & Seymour, 255 F.R.D. at 335.
274. See Fendi Adele S.R.L. v. Filene's Basement, Inc., No. 06 Civ. 244, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32615, at *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2009).
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result is that it could take significant labor to truly perform an
exhaustive search of a database and the archived copies.275
Finally, because of the costs of equipment, network bandwidth,
and power, it can be expensive to maintain a copy of a large database
for purposes of compliance with a producer's discovery obligations.
For instance, in one case, a litigant asserted it would cost over
$27,000 per month simply to maintain a restored database for
purposes of satisfying requests for discovery related to the
database.276
4.

Metadata

Another driver of discovery cost is the metadata associated with
electronically stored information. Metadata refers generally to the
information stored in a file in excess of the "body" or "main portion"
of the file.277 Examples include the name of the file, a file's location
on disk, the file's type, size, and access control list,278 the last
modified date, the creation date, and the date of last access. 279 Files
created in certain programs may have even more extensive
metadata. For instance, Microsoft Word documents may contain a
revision history, comments, information about the author, and other
information.280 These changes can even accompany a Microsoft Word
document that is electronically converted into the Adobe Acrobat
"PDF" format.281 The formulas in spreadsheet documents are also
elements of metadata.282 Often, a hardcopy of a spreadsheet will
contain the result of the formula's calculation, but not the formula
itself.283 This does not disclose how the calculation was done, so a
requesting party may have a legitimate interest in obtaining the
spreadsheet with the formula metadata intact.284
Metadata can be an expensive challenge, because a producer
may need to (1) determine whether it must produce metadata, (2)
275. See id.
276. Best Buy Stores, L.P. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 247 F.R.D. 567,
570 (D. Minn. 2007).
277. See generally W. Lawrence Wescott II, The IncreasingImportance of Metadata
in Electronic Discovery, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, $T 2-8 (2008).
278. An access control list is a list of the users who the operating system should
permit to access a file. Access Control Lists (ITS 6.0), MICROSOFT, http://www.
microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/WindowsServer2003/Library/IIS/27f4d33b-ab424705-b214-0031d37e0ef8.mspx?mfr=true (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
279. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 645-46 (D. Kan. 2005).
280. Id. at 647; Philip J. Favro, A New Frontierin Electronic Discovery: Preserving
and ObtainingMetadata, 13 B.U. J. Scl. & TECH. L. 1, at 7-8 (2007).
281. Favro, supranote 280, at 9.
282. Williams, 230 F.R.D., at 653, 657.
283. Favro, supranote 280, at 15 (quoting Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 647).
284. Id. (quoting Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 647).
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preserve and disclose relevant metadata, (3) find a way to review the
metadata for responsiveness and privilege, and (4) produce
information with relevant metadata intact but without privileged or
irrelevant metadata. As in other areas of e-discovery, a producer
must be prepared to justify its production efforts; it may also need to
employ technical experts both to produce a search and production
protocol and to justify that protocol against challenges.285
The first problem is determining whether metadata is part of the
discovery request. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not
explicitly address the production of metadata,286 and there have been
conflicting trends in cases addressing the issue.287 Normally, Rule
34(b) permits a requesting party to specify the form in which it
wishes to receive the data.288 Presumably, this would allow a
requesting party to specify that it wishes to receive responsive ESI
with its metadata intact.289 If a requesting party does not specify the
format in which it wishes to receive the requested ESI, the producer
may deliver it in either the form in which the producer ordinarily
maintains it or in any other reasonably usable form.290
Frequently, whether metadata is part of the request is not clear
on the face of the request. 291 Lawyers face the dilemma of discussing
the metadata at a discovery conference.292 If a producer discloses the
285. See, e.g., Autotech Techs. Ltd. P'ship v. AutomationDirect.com, Inc., 248 F.R.D.
556, 558-60 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (concluding a producer did not have to produce metadata
in its native form when the requestor did not explicitly ask for native data and the
producer produced the requested information in paper and PDF formats). Although
the producer prevailed, the producer did have to defend itself against the requesting
party's motion to compel discovery. Id.
286. Wescott, supranote 277, 9.
287. Id. TT 15-33.
288. Id. T 10; FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(C). Nonetheless, a producer "may object to the
form of production and elect not to produce the metadata," the requesting party can
"seek[ its production through a motion to compel." Favro, supranote 280, at 19.
289. Wescott, supra note 277, T 9.
290. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(E); Wescott, supranote 277, 1 11.
291. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 645-46 (D. Kan. 2005)
(describing the producer's uncertainty inherent to the disclosure when the request is
silent about metadata).
292. Rule 26(f) mandates a discovery conference. Rule 26(f)(3)(C) specifically
requires litigants to discuss "any issues about disclosure or discovery of electronically
stored information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced." FED.
R. CIv. P. 36(f)(3)(C). The advisory committee notes to the 2006 amendments to the
rules specifically mention that the parties may need to discuss the production of
metadata, and note that it is difficult to review metadata for privilege. Fed R. Civ. P.
26(f), 2006 Advisory Committee Notes. They also note that the presence of metadata in
an electronic file is often not "apparent to the reader." Id. In any case, "[w]hether this
information should be produced may be among the topics discussed in the Rule 26(f)
conference. If it is, it may need to be reviewed to ensure that no privileged information
is included, further complicating the task of privilege review." Id.
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existence of potentially relevant metadata, the requesting party,
who, under the current rule lacks substantial incentive to exercise
restraint, is likely to ask for as much metadata as it can get. The
producer thereby incurs additional cost. Or, the producer can quietly
assume that the metadata is not part of the request, and deal with
any challenges as they arise.293 This is a dangerous course that may
make a producer look as if she is trying to avoid disclosure of
relevant information.294
Unfortunately for producers, courts have come to varying
opinions regarding whether producers should presume that they
must disclose metadata. For instance, in Williams, the court
concluded that the production of metadata was required when the
producer is aware or should be aware that particular metadata was
relevant to the dispute and the requesting party asks for the
documents in the format in which they are kept in the ordinary
course of business.295 Otherwise, the Williams court concluded, the
general presumption is against the mandatory disclosure of
metadata.296
In 2004, the Sedona Conference agreed. They noted that, "In
most cases, . . . metadata will have no material evidentiary value....
And there is also the real danger that information recorded by the
computer may be inaccurate."297 The conference also concluded that
"any time (and money) spent reviewing [metadata] is a waste of
resources."298 Although the conference conceded that metadata would
occasionally be useful for producers because it would (1) tend to
prevent the "inadvertent or deliberate modification of evidence" and
(2) allow a producer an opportunity to contest the authenticity of a
document "if the metadata would be material to that determination,"

293. E.g., Autotech Techs., 248 F.R.D. at 556-60 (describing a case in which the
requestor specified no means of production, and the producer appears to have
unilaterally decided not to produce the documents in their original electronic format;
the requestor later filed a motion to compel seeking the electronic versions).
294. See Bray & Gillespie Mgmt. LLC v. Lexington Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D. 568 (M.D.
Fla. 2009) (concluding a party's failure to produce metadata was improper and
appeared to be part of a "Practice of Concealing and Misrepresenting Material
Information"); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring a party to disclose,
without a discovery request, "a copy-or a description by category and location-of all
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing
party has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to support its claims or
defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment").
295. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652.
296. Id.
297. The
Sedona
Conference,
The Sedona Principles: Best Practices

Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production, 5
SEDONA CONF. J. 151, 156 (2004).
298. Id. at 193.
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the conference recommended that the default presumption should
indeed be against requiring disclosure of metadata except when the
producer knows that particular metadata is relevant.299
Some courts have gone even further. In Wyeth v. Impax
Laboratories, the court adopted a blanket presumption against
disclosure of metadata.300 Other courts have adopted the contrary
presumption, however. s01
If a producer concludes that it must produce metadata, it must
be careful not to modify the requested metadata during production.
This can be a challenge because even accessing the data can change
the metadata.302 For example, accessing a file would change the last
accessed date that the storing computer maintain.303 Although Rule
37(e) protects parties that lose ESI during the "routine, good-faith
operation of an electronic information system,"304 the production of
data for discovery purposes is probably not such a circumstance.305
For instance, in Hagenbuch v. 3B6 Sistemi ElettroniciIndustriali
S.R.L.,306 the court compelled the production of native-format
documents that the producer had already produced in TIFF format.
s07 The court reasoned that the TIFF versions did not contain all of
the information in the original files, because they were missing
metadata.308 This metadata was an important element of the
plaintiffs case because it would help in producing a timeline of the
events relevant to the litigation.309 The TIFF format information, the
299. Id.; see also Favro, supra note 280, at 5-6, 11-12 (2007) (describing the value of
metadata in "establishing and ensuring document integrity").
300. Wyeth v. Imax Laboratories, 248 F.R.D. 169, 171 (D. Del. 2006). The converse
side of this problem for requesting parties is that if metadata may contain discoverable
information, a requesting party should specifically request the desired metadata.
Autotech Techs. Ltd. P'ship v. AutomationDirect.com, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 556, 560 (N.D.
Ill. 2008).
301. Wescott, supra note 277, 22.
302. Favro, supra note 280, at 20; Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., 230
F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005).
303. Wescott, supra note 277, 1 3.
304. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); infra Part III.C.3.
305. See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 656-57; infra Part III.C.3.
306. No. 04 C 3109, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10838 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2006).
307. Id. at *8-10. The TIFF (Tagged Image File Format) format is an image format
that is often used to exchange images of printed documents. See PSEG Power N.Y.,
Inc. v. Alberici Constrs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-657, 2007 WL 2687670, at *2 n.2 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 7, 2007) (describing TIFFs as "a flexible and adaptable file format for storing
images and documents used worldwide. TIFF files use LZW lossless compression
without distorting or losing the quality due to the compression. In layman's terms,
TIFF is very much like taking a mirror image of many documents in format that can
be compressed for storage purposes").
308. Hagenbuch, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10838, at *8-11.
309. Id.
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court concluded, was neither in the form the producer used in the
ordinary course of business, nor reasonably usable because of the
lack of the metadata.310 Therefore, the court ordered the production
of the original data with the metadata intact.311

Moreover, in Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., a
Kansas district court concluded that a producer had failed to show
cause for failing to produce data in an unaltered state. 312 The court
had ordered the producer to produce certain ESI in the state in which
it was ordinarily maintained.313 Nevertheless, the producer had
locked certain data cells in an Excel spreadsheet.314 The producer
argued that this protected the integrity of the produced data file.315
The producer escaped sanctions only because the court, in its 2005
decision, agreed that the law related to the alteration of metadata
was not entirely clear.316 As a result of the Williams decision,
producers in the District of Kansas are on notice that altering the
metadata in a file can warrant a sanction.317
The producer also faces a challenge in reviewing metadata for
privilege, because it may be hard to access and review en masse.318
Often, it cannot be directly printed out or viewed on screen. 319 This
also makes it difficult to deliver the metadata to requestors who do
not want the data in its original format or lack the appropriate
software to read the metadata.320
In sum, metadata increases costs associated with discovery
310. Id. at *7-12.
311. Id.
312. Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 655-57 (D. Kan.
2005).
313. Id. at 655-56.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 655.
316. Id. at 656.
317. See id.
318. Id. at 646-47.
319. Favro, supranote 280, at 4.
320. Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 2005)
(noting that some metadata "can be hidden or embedded and unavailable to computer
users who are not technically adept"); id. at 646 ("Most metadata is generally not
visible when a document is printed or when the document is converted to image
files."). Indeed, the review of files containing metadata poses a potentially expensive
and embarrassing trap for lawyers; if a file contains privileged information that the
producer inadvertently or unknowingly hands over to the requesting party, the
disclosure may violate the lawyer's duty of confidentiality and subject the lawyer to
malpractice liability for the waiver of the attorney/client privilege. See id. at 647; see
also Favro, supra note 280, at 4-6, 10-11 (describing embarrassing disclosures of
metadata). If the requesting party does not seek to obtain metadata, or if the metadata
contains privileged information, the producer may need to use a "scrubbing" program
that eliminates the metadata from the file. See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 647.
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because it is difficult to know what metadata exists, how to review it,
and when it needs to be disclosed to a requestor. It can also be
expensive for a producer to ensure a defensible production because,
in many cases, it will require the assistance of a technical expert to
assess and disclose metadata properly.
5.

Deleted Data

It is often possible to restore electronically stored information
that has been deleted. As with backup tapes, however, this process
can be difficult, and may even require the assistance of computer
forensics specialists. Sometimes, files can be easily restored because
there are safeguards against deletion of information that protect
computer users from inadvertently deleting data.321 Indeed, the most
common system for doing this is the aforementioned tape backup.
Other times, when a user has deleted a file, the space it occupies on a
disk is marked as available for storing new information, but the old
information is not erased, and can be retrieved using sophisticated
software or hardware.322 In yet other cases, the data may exist in
another location where it has not been deleted, such as in the case of
an e-mail message that a person sends to multiple recipients; even if
one recipient deletes the e-mail, it still exists in the other recipients'
mailboxes.323

The restoration of deleted data exacerbates the problem of costly
discovery because retrieval is expensive. Although the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure provide some protection against the cost of
restoration of inaccessible information,324 including deleted ESI, the
producer bears the burden of proving that all of the readily accessible
sources of the requested ESI have been adequately searched.325 The
producer may also have to incur the expense of employing computer

321. E.g., Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 56 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting the defendant's
computer systems retained e-mails for seven days after the user deleted them).
322. Ordinarily, this is a desirable way to improve computer performance, because
it saves the computer the time needed to erase the old data. Even when the location on
a disk is overwritten with new data, the new data may not occupy all of the space that
the old data did. This results in "slack space." Id. at 58. "Deleted data, or remnants of
deleted data, is often found in a computer's slack space." Peskoff v. Faber, 240 F.R.D.
26, 29 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing United States v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., 211 F.R.D.
31, 46 n.7 (D. Conn. 2002)).

323. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Governing Discovery of Electronically Stored Information: Fitting
Electronic Discovery into the Overall Discovery Mix, in SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note
48, at 9 (noting that information may end up on "such diverse items as hand-held
devices and home computers of employees").
324. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
325. See, e.g., Baker v. Gerould, No. 03-CV-6558L, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28628, at

*2-3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2008).
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forensic experts to perform the restoration, especially if the producer
has not made a convincing case that the requested data cannot be
found elsewhere.326
While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(B) provides some
protection to potential producers from the onerous and expensive
burden of disclosing inaccessible data, including difficult-to-retrieve
deleted data, the rule requires the producer to identify sources that
may contain relevant and responsive information that are not
reasonably accessible, and, if challenged, to prove the inaccessibility
of the data.327 Thus, the rule leaves open the possibility that the
rule's protection applies only to those sources that a party initially
identifies as inaccessible.328 Consequently, a producer that later
discovers or concludes a source of ESI is not accessible because of
deletion may not always be able to convince the court that it should
not have to produce this data at its own expense. 329
Thus, because of the vastness of ESI that many litigants store,
and the difficulty of adequately and accurately searching this ESI,
producers can already expect to incur significant costs. These costs
are further increased because producers must be prepared to engage
in ancillary litigation to defend their search process against
requesting parties who allege the production was inadequate or
incomplete.
III. THE LAW OF E-DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Unfortunately, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exacerbate
the problem of ancillary litigation further. While the rules were
amended in 2006 to at least partially address the challenges of ediscovery, they continued the traditional American rule of permitting
broad discovery and forcing producers to pay for the production.
As this section demonstrates, the federal rules included a safety
valve in Rule 26(b)(2)(B), which allows a producer to limit requests
for information from sources of electronically stored information
326. See, e.g., Peskoff, 244 F.R.D. at 63.
327. DAVID K. ISOM, INACESSIBLE ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION: A
REPORT FROM THE FRONT LINES 7, 9-10 (2008), available at http://www.calO.us
courts.gov/conference/downloads/isom.pdf. Some commentators criticize the rule for
allowing the producer to identify inaccessible sources, claiming that it allows a
producer to determine its own production responsibilities. See Theodore C. Hirt, The
Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule 26(b)(2)(B)-A Reasonable Measure for
ControllingElectronic Discovery?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12 (2007).
328. Id. See also infra Part III.C.3.
329. Id.; Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 2008 WL 2714239, at *2 (E.D. Mich.,
July 7, 2008); SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 299; David K. Isom, The Burden of
Discovering Inaccessible Electronically Stored Information, 2009 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (2000). But see id. at 9-10 (noting that some courts have been willing to apply rule
26(b)(2)(B) to sources that the producing party did not identify early in the litigation).
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which it identifies as "not reasonably accessible." As this part will
show, this safety valve provision does not go nearly far enough in
sparing producers from inordinate litigation costs, and, indeed,
imposes yet more litigation costs on producers who wish to attempt
to take advantage of it.
The federal rules included another safety valve provision in Rule
37(e) which grants safe harbor to producers when data is lost
through the "routine, good-faith operation" of an information system.
Sadly, as this part will also show, federal courts have all but read
this safe harbor provision out of the rules. They have generally
concluded that once the duty to preserve arises-and it arises as soon
as litigation becomes foreseeable-any deletion of relevant data is, by
definition, not in good faith.
These safety valve provisions not only fail to adequately control
the costs associated with e-discovery, they sometimes increase it by
fostering ancillary litigation on the producer's entitlement to the
protection of these safety valves. As a result, the present rules
unjustly assign the increased litigation costs of e-discovery entirely to
producers.

A.

Cost Shifting in Federal Court

The practice of making the requesting party, rather than the
producing party, bear some or all of the costs of production is known
as cost shifting (or cost sharing).330 The cornerstone case in this area
is Rowe Entertainment.331 In Rowe Entertainment, Magistrate Judge
James C. Francis noted, "Too often, discovery is not just about
uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the
parties can afford to disinter. As this case illustrates, discovery
expenses frequently escalate when information is stored in electronic
form."332 In the case, the plaintiffs who were "black concert
promoters," sued a variety of defendants claiming that the
defendants had frozen them out of the market for promoting white
bands using "discriminatory and anti-competitive practices."333
During the discovery stage of the case, several of the defendants
moved for a protective order to "reliev[e] them of the obligation of
producing electronic mail .

discovery
330.

requests."334

.

. that may be responsive to the plaintiffs'

Judge

Francis

described

the

plaintiffs'

Rowe Entm't v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

331. Id.; see also James M. Evangelista, Polishing the "Gold Standard"on the eDiscovery Cost-Shifting Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 1 (2004) (describing the Rowe Entertainment case as the gold standard in this
area of law).
332. Rowe Entm't, 205 F.R.D. at 423 (emphasis added).
333. Id.
334. Id.
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requests as "sweeping":
For example, they [plaintiffs] demand production of all documents
concerning any communication between any defendants relating to
the selection of concert promoters and bids to promote concerts.
Similarly, the plaintiffs have requested "all documents concerning
the selection of concert promoters, and the solicitation, and bidding
processes relating to concert promotions." They have also
demanded "all documents concerning market shares, market share
values, market conditions, or geographic boundaries in which
any ... concert promoter operates." These are but three examples
of the thirty-five requests made in the plaintiffs' first document
demand. 335
The moving defendants responded that the "burden and expense
involved" with production "would far outweigh any possible benefit in
terms of discovery of additional information."336 The defendants also
requested that, if the court required production, the court also order
the plaintiffs to pay the expenses of production.337
In analyzing the defendants' motions for protective orders, the
court conceded that "[t]he plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated
that the discovery they seek is generally relevant."338 The court was
also unable to credit the defendants' contentions that the e-mail
sources that the plaintiffs had requested would not contain relevant
information, or that the relevant information had already been
produced in hardcopy.339 Therefore, the court concluded that there
was "no justification for a blanket order precluding discovery of the
defendants' e-mails on the ground that such discovery is unlikely to
provide relevant information."340
The court found the issue of whether to shift some or all of the
costs of production "more difficult."341 The court first noted that
"'[u]nder [the discovery] rules, the presumption is that the
responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery
requests."'342 "Nevertheless," the court continued, "a court may
protect the responding party from 'undue burden or expense' by
shifting some or all of the costs of production to the requesting
party."343
The court was unwilling to adopt either of two hardline

335.
336.

Id. at 424 (record citations omitted).
Id.

337. Id.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978)).

343.

Id. (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. 340 at 359).
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approaches to the production of the requested electronically stored
information. First, the court rejected an approach, premised on the
notion that the necessity for retrieval is "an ordinary and foreseeable
risk" of storing data, requiring the responding party to
unconditionally bear the costs of producing stored ESI.344 The court
reasoned that the underlying assumption-"that the party retaining
information does so because that information is useful"-is of
questionable validity when it comes to easy-to-store ESI.345 Moreover,
the court also reasoned that, even when data is retained, it is often
retained not in the expectation of routine future use; rather, it is
retained as a disaster-recovery tool.346 As such, data stored on some
inaccessible sources, such as backup tapes, is stored in a fashion that
"mirrors the computer's structure, not the human records
management structure, if there is one."347
The court likewise rejected the opposing hardline approach,
which Judge Francis referred to as the "market approach." The
"market approach" would require the requesting party to bear the
costs of production of ESI in discovery, under the theory that the
requesting party can then "perform a cost-benefit analysis and decide
whether the effort is justified."348 The court rejected the market
approach because it ran counter to the "producer-pays" presumption
as expressed in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,349 and because
"it places a price on justice that will not always be acceptable: it
would result in the abandonment of meritorious claims by litigants
too poor to pay for necessary discovery."350
Thus, the court concluded that it must instead apply a
"balancing approach" that would consider such factors as: (1) the
specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering
critical information; (3) the availability of such information from
other sources; (4) the purposes for which the responding party
maintains the requested data; (5) the relative benefit to the parties of
obtaining the information; (6) the total cost associated with
production; (7) the relative ability of each party to control costs and
its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available to each party. 351
When it applied this balancing analysis to the facts, the court
344. Id. at 429 (quoting In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos.
94 C 897, MDL 997, 1995 WL 360526, at *2 (N.D. I1I. June 5, 1995)).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. (quoting Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil
Litigation, SF97 ALI-ABA 1079, 1085 (2001)).
348. Id.
349. 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
350. Rowe Entm't v. William Morris Agency, 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
351. Id.
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concluded that the relevant factors "tip[ped] heavily in favor of
shifting to the plaintiffs the costs of obtaining discovery of e-mails in
this case."352
Federal District Judge Shira Scheindlin later criticized the Rowe
Entertainment decision and others that attempted to "devise[]
creative solutions for balancing the broad scope of discovery
prescribed in Rule 26(b)(1) with the cost-consciousness of Rule
26(b)(2)" because when courts-like the Rowe Entertainment courtbalance the relevant factors, they tended to force the requesting
party "to bear the cost of discovery."asa In Zubulake, Judge Scheindlin
reiterated the presumption that the producing party in discovery
must pay for its own production.354 Judge Scheindlin wrote, "Any
principled approach to electronic evidence must respect this
presumption."355
Judge Scheindlin applied her criticism of Rowe Entertainmentin
Zubulake. In Zubulake, the plaintiff, Laura Zubulake sued the
defendant, UBS Warburg, for gender discrimination and illegal
retaliation.356 Zubulake sought discovery of "all documents
concerning any communications by or between UBS employees
concerning Plaintiff," including computer data.357 Although the
parties initially agreed on a method for producing the e-mail
messages Zubulake expected to get in response to her requests, the
defendant later informed Zubulake that it would not search backup
tapes for the requested e-mail messages because the cost was
prohibitive.358 UBS Warburg's technical experts testified at some
length as to the difficult, time-consuming, and expensive nature of
restoring and searching e-mail from backup tapes. 359
The Zubulake court first rejected the notion that UBS Warburg
did not have to produce the requested information.360 Then, the court
turned to the question of whether Zubulake should bear any of the
significant costs of searching the backup tapes. Invoking the Federal

352. Id. at 432.
353. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
354. Id. at 317. See also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358
(1978) ("[T]he presumption is that the responding party must bear the expense of
complying with discovery requests, but he may invoke the district court's discretion
under Rule 26 (c) to grant orders protecting him from 'undue burden or expense."').
355. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 317.
356. Id. at 311.
357. Id. at 312.
358. Id. at 313.
359. Id. at 314-15.
360. Id. at 317. It was particularly damning for UBS Warburg that Zubulake had
copies of e-mail messages that should have been a part of UBS Warburg's production,
but that UBS Warburg never produced. Id.
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Rules of Civil Procedure, the court concluded that the Rowe
Entertainment balancing approach must be modified to better match
the "producer-pays" presumption.361 The court strongly criticized
other courtS362 that had concluded that some level of cost-shifting
was justified whenever ESI was involved: "This makes no sense.
Electronic evidence is frequently cheaper and easier to produce than
paper evidence because it can be searched automatically, key words
can be run for privilege checks, and the production can be made in
electronic form obviating the need for mass photocopying."363
The court further declared that routine cost-shifting would make
it practically impossible for private parties to sue large corporations.
The court reasoned:
As large companies increasingly move to entirely paper-free
environments, the frequent use of cost-shifting will have the effect
of crippling discovery in discrimination and retaliation cases. This
will both undermine the "strong public policy favoring resolving
disputes on their merits," and may ultimately deter the filing of
potentially meritorious claims. 364
The Zubulake court acknowledged Rowe Entertainment, noting
that "its eight factor test has unquestionably become the gold
standard for courts resolving electronic discovery disputes."365
Nevertheless, the Zubulake court also concluded that the Rowe
Entertainment factors would "generally favor cost-shifting," and, that
"of the handful of reported opinions that apply Rowe or some
modification thereof, all of them have ordered the cost of discovery to
be shifted to the requesting party."366 Thus, the Zubulake court
determined that the factors must be modified so that they did not
favor cost-shifting.367 The court concluded the proper considerations
were:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to
discover relevant information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;

361. Id.
362. See, e.g., Wiginton v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 568, 577 (N.D. Ill.
2004) (concluding that the plaintiffs should pay seventy-five percent of the costs of
production).
363. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Part II,
supra,belies Judge Scheindlin's reasoning about the ease of searching and producing
ESI. While Judge Scheindlin may be correct in that technology can, in some cases,
ease the difficulty of production and privilege review, certainly that is not true with
respect to all ESI.
364. Id. at 317-18.
365. Id. at 320.
366. Id.
367. Id.
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3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in
controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available
to each party;
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its
incentive to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the
information.368
The Zubulake court emphasized, however, that these factors
should not weigh equally in the cost-shifting calculus.369 Rather, the
first two factors are the most important.370 The court also concluded
that cost-shifting is appropriate "only when electronic data is
relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes."371
The court found it had insufficient evidence to determine
whether to order the defendant to search all of its backup tapes for
responsive e-mails. Therefore, it ordered the defendant to produce, at
its own expense, all responsive messages from five backup tapes that
Zubulake was to select.372 Further, the court ordered the defendant to
"prepare an affidavit detailing the results of its search, as well as the
time and money spent."373 This would enable the court to "conduct
the appropriate cost-shifting analysis."374
The Zubulake court later emphasized that, ordinarily, even when
cost shifting is appropriate under the seven factor test, the only costs
that should be shifted were the costs of rendering any inaccessible
data accessible.375 Once the data is in an accessible format, the court
reasoned, there is no basis in law for requiring a requesting party to
pay for the costs of searching it or reviewing it for privilege.376 The
court also reasoned that the producer has the "exclusive ability to

368. Id. at 322.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 323.
371. Id. at 324.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
376. Id. at 291. See also Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., No. 06-15601, 2008
WL 2714239, at *2-3. (E.D. Mich. July 7, 2008) (concluding that a motion for cost
shifting must be presented to the court before inaccessible data is produced in part
because, once the data is produced, the requesting party cannot make intelligent
choices to constrain costs, nor can the court consider alternative means of controlling
the burdens.) The Cason-Merenda court also reasoned that "to the extent that DMC
maintains that the information produced by it in discovery was accessible, court
ordered cost shifting is inappropriate." Id. at *3.
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control the cost" of review and control over the "review protocol."377
After the defendant performed its search, the Zubulake court
applied its new seven-factor test:
Factors one through four tip against cost-shifting (although factor
two only slightly so). Factors five and six are neutral, and factor
seven favors cost-shifting. As noted in my earlier opinion in this
case, however, a list of factors is not merely a matter of counting
and adding; it is only a guide. Because some of the factors cut
against cost-shifting, but only slightly so-in particular, the
possibility that the continued production will produce valuable new
information-some cost-shifting is appropriate in this case,
although UBS should pay the majority of the costs. There is plainly
relevant evidence that is only available on UBS's backup tapes. At
the same time, Zubulake has not been able to show that there is
indispensable evidence on those backup tapes ... .378
Thus, the Zubulake court concluded that it would be appropriate
for the plaintiff-requestor, Zubulake, to pay for 25 percent of the
costs of rendering the backup tapes accessible.379
The Zubulake seven factor test and Zubulake's presumption that
cost-shifting is never appropriate with respect to accessible ESI
remain good law in the federal courts. 38 0 Nevertheless, this approach
can be criticized on several grounds. First, because Zubulake is not a
binding precedent on any federal court, courts can and do modify the
cost-shifting analysis as they feel necessary. 381 Second, because the
inquiry is highly fact-specific, to the extent that appellate courts even
review the decisions of trial courts, they will be deferential to the
trial court's decisions.382 As such, there will be little precedent to

377.
378.

Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 290.
Id. at 289.

379. Id. at 291. It is perhaps ironic that, even after Judge Scheindlin's criticism of
prior federal courts' tendencies to order cost-shifting in cases involving significant ediscovery, Judge Scheindlin nonetheless ordered cost shifting when she addressed the
issues in Zubulake. Compare Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), with Zubulake, 216 F.R.D. at 284-290. This raises the question of
whether, when a judge engages in the heavily factual analysis called for under
Zubulake's seven factor test, the cost-shifting decision is not in some way influenced by
the counter-intuitive nature of the producer-pays presumption (i.e. that the producer
must pay to produce information, even though the requesting party receives the value
of the production), particularly in fact situations where a plaintiff is seeking to make a
defendant go through extraordinary steps to make accessible the very evidence the
plaintiff needs to prevail.
380. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 164, at 10-11.
381. Id. at 11.
382. E.g., John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d 448, 458-59 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated and
remanded, No. 09-6145, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25589 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2010)
("Although district courts generally maintain broad discretion in matters of discovery
this court will find an abuse of that discretion if 'left with a definite and firm
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make the application of the cost shifting factors uniform (and,
therefore, predictable) among the federal courts.38 3 Nor will there be
any practical review for litigants who object to a trial court's decision
on cost shifting,384 even though the cost-shifting decision may be
outcome-determinative.385 And, most importantly, of course, is the
problem that the present cost shifting analysis is predicated on the
"producer-pays" presumption, which makes the producer pay for a
search conducted for the requesting party's benefit.386
B. Protectionsfrom Discovery of Inaccessible ESI
One of the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure attempted to reduce the costs of e-discovery. Rule
26(b)(2)(B), the so called "two-tier discovery" provision,387 allows a
producer to limit discovery of electronically stored information to
more readily accessible sources. In pertinent part, the provision
reads:
conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment."') (quoting Bill
Call Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 48 F.3d 201, 209 (6th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
omitted)).
383. See Baston v. Bagley, 420 F.3d 632, 637 (6th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that
appellate review of death penalty decisions improves consistency).
384. See Goetz, 531 F.3d at 457-58 (observing that trial courts' discovery decisions
are not subject to interlocutory review, and, therefore, a party who wishes to challenge
a discovery decision is limited to seeking relief in the form of a writ of mandamus). A
court will grant a petition for a writ of mandamus only under extraordinary
circumstances:
Mandamus from this court is generally reserved for "questions of unusual
importance necessary to the economical and efficient administration of
justice' or 'important issues of first impression."
. . . We examine whether: (1) the party seeking the writ has no other

adequate means, such as direct appeal, to attain the relief desired; (2) the
petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal;
(3) the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) the
district court's order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent
disregard of the federal rules; and (5) the district court's order raises new
and important problems, or issues of law of first impression.
Id. at 457 (quoting EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 694 F.2d 1055, 1061 (6th Cir. 1982)).
385. Mazza et al., supra note 94, at 49. ("Cost-shifting battles are hotly contested
and for good reason: decisions on motions regarding who will be required to pay for
discovery responses (the cost of which may run into the hundreds of thousands, if not
tens of millions, of dollars) can impact severely how an action proceeds and in fact may
be outcome-determinative in some cases.").
386. See Molot, supra note 105, at 74 ("[E]ven where discovery is honestly intended
to obtain information, and not to burden the opponent, a party nevertheless may make
requests that are not cost justified, that is, requests it would not choose to make were
it to bear the costs of compliance. Each party simply lacks incentives to weigh the costs
and benefits of its discovery requests because these costs are not internalized.").
387. See generally Hirt, supra note 327.
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Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information. A party
need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or
for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought
must show that the information is not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court
may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the
requesting party shows good cause . . . . The court may specify

conditions for the discovery. 388
Conceptually, the rule attempts to divert parties seeking
discovery toward using those sources that are reasonably accessible
to the producer.389 When a producer responds to a discovery request,
it can "identify, by category or type, the sources containing
potentially responsive information that it is neither searching nor
producing."390 As long as the producer is able to satisfy the
requesting party's needs from reasonably accessible sources of
information, there is no need for the requesting party to force the
issue further.391 Nevertheless, if the requesting party is not satisfied,
it can file a motion to compel discovery to force the producer to justify
its decision to classify the information sources as inaccessible.392 If
the producer is successful, the burden then shifts to the requesting
party to show that there is "good cause" to order the discovery from
the inaccessible sources. 393 In a wicked turn, this rule, which is
intended to reduce the costs and burdens of conducting discovery,

388. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
389. Hirt, supra note 327, 1 4-5. The committee note to Rule 26 notes:
The volume of-and the ability to search-much electronically stored
information means that in many cases the responding party will be able to
produce information from reasonably accessible sources that will fully satisfy
the parties' discovery needs. In many circumstances the requesting party
should obtain and evaluate the information from such sources before
insisting that the responding party search and produce information
contained on sources that are not reasonably accessible. If the requesting
party continues to seek discovery of information from sources identified as
not reasonably accessible, the parties should discuss the burdens and costs of
accessing and retrieving the information, the needs that may establish good
cause for requiring all or part of the requested discovery even if the
information sought is not reasonably accessible, and conditions on obtaining
and producing the information that may be appropriate.
FED. R. COv. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
390. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note.
391. Id.
392. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2); Hirt, supra note 327, $T 7-8. A producer may likewise
take the initiative to raise the issue of accessibility in a motion for a protective order,
but doing so does not alter the producer's burden to demonstrate that the information
source is inaccessible. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B); Hirt, supranote 327, T 25.
393. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2); Hirt, supra note 327, 1 8.
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may itself require the parties to conduct additional discovery to
explicitly address whether the producer's information sources are
indeed inaccessible.394
Unfortunately, this provision has not meaningfully addressed
the cost drivers associated with e-discovery. First, it may encourage
bad information management practices. Because producers may be
relieved of their burden of production with respect to inaccessible
sources, they have an incentive not to improve their information
management practices to improve their accessibility.395 Indeed, as
technology improves, it is plausible that organizations could
implement new technologies that would improve the accessibility of
their information.396 Indeed, routine business operations might
benefit from these kinds of improvements. Counsel for such
organizations might nonetheless advise clients to resist these
changes so that the universe of data that must routinely be produced
during litigation remains smaller, and therefore, less costly to review
for responsiveness and privilege. When organizations forego
technological changes that would improve efficiency as a strategic
response to the litigation environment, they incur the costs of
sustained inefficiency.
Second, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) creates more litigation and costly
discovery in part because it does not indicate any "sources" that are
generally considered accessible or inaccessible.397 While, as the
committee notes indicate, no such definition would be technologically
accurate or relevant over the passage of time, the lack of categorical
rules makes it difficult for any producer to rely on the protections
inherent in the rule.398
Third, information sources are not really either accessible or
inaccessible.399 Accessibility runs along a spectrum. The question of
inaccessibility, when considered along with the rule's "good cause"
provision400 that allows a requesting party to obtain discovery in
spite of inaccessibility, is one of cost justification; almost all
394. Hirt, supra note 327, T 10.
395. Id. 1 32.
396. See id.
397. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note. DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note 61,
at 11. Nevertheless, the Zubulake court concluded that there was a spectrum of
accessibility that ran from "Active, online data" on the most accessible side and
"Erased, fragmented or damaged data" on the least accessible side. Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
398. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note; DERTOUZOS ET AL., supra note
61, at 11.
399. Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 318-19.
400. "[The court may nonetheless order discovery from [inaccessible] sources if the
requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)."
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
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information is accessible for the right price.401 Thus, as Judge
Scheindlin points out, "[t]he fundamental question is: 'Will the
uniqueness and/or quality of responsive data that I get from any
particular set of ESI justify the cost of the acquisition of that
data?"'402 Thus, courts often apply a "marginal utility" test when
deciding whether to order production of information from inaccessible
sources. 403 Under this test, "[t]he more likely it is that [an
inaccessible source] contains information that is relevant to a claim
or defense, the fairer it is that the [producer] search at its own
expense. The less likely it is, the more unjust it would be to make the
[producer] search at its own expense."404
The marginal utility test makes intuitive sense. It funnels a
requesting party's discovery efforts toward the least inaccessible
source or sources that are likely to contain relevant information
because they are more likely to be worth the effort and expense of
making them accessible again. The analysis assumes, however, that
it is possible to accurately determine the likelihood that any
particular inaccessible source is likely to contain relevant
information that is not available on a more accessible source. 405
However, the very problem of inaccessibility means that it is indeed
likely that a producer may not know exactly what information is
available in an inaccessible source. 406 Judge Scheindlin dismisses
this argument, saying "while it may be true that a given source of
ESI will be difficult and/or expensive to deal with, such a fact alone
should not be enough to remove that ESI from consideration."407
Perhaps if one assumes that the net economic benefit of discovering
relevant information is exceedingly valuable, this is true. It is more
likely, however, that there are at least some inaccessible sources that
are so expensive to render accessible again that the requesting party
ought to bear the cost of production. Indeed, placing the cost on the
party who will actually reap the benefit allows the requesting party
to make a rational economic decision about whether the potential for
benefits justifies the production.408 In such a situation, a requesting
party might even decide that it is more rational to pay for some level

401. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 290.
402. Id.
403. E.g., McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001); Oxford House v. City
of Topeka, No. 06-4004-RDR, 2007 WL 1246200, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 27, 2007);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
404. McPeek, 202 F.R.D. at 34.
405. See SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 291.
406. See id.
407. Id.
408. See Rowe Entm't, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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of preliminary investigation409 into the contents of the inaccessible
sources so that it can make a more rational cost/benefit decision. 410

C.

PreservingElectronicallyStored Information

Although producers face significant costs to search for and
produce ESI, and can rarely obtain relief from these costs under Rule
26(b)(2)(B), they also face significant costs because, under the federal
rules, as soon as litigation becomes reasonably foreseeable, courts
generally impose on parties a duty to preserve information that is
relevant to the litigation or anticipated litigation.411
Facially, this duty imposes no obligation for a party to retain
every document or piece of information in its possession.412 The duty,
does, however, require a potential producer to "preserve what it
knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,
is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, afid/or is the
subject of a pending discovery request."413 In short, organizations
must satisfy themselves-and the court-that any data they delete
while litigation is pending is not relevant to litigation or anticipated
litigation.414
Courts do not agree on exactly when the duty to preserve
attaches.415 "[S]ome courts have accepted common signs of looming
litigation to include communication with the adverse parties or when
related litigation is filed, other courts have found that the duty
should not adhere until a specific discovery request has been
made."416 More recent decisions have been less willing to accept that
409. The preliminary investigation would almost certainly include some kind of
sampling. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); see also Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251, 257 (D. Md.
2008) (noting that sampling was the only prudent method of testing the accuracy of a
keyword search).
410. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
411. Silvestri v. General Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001); Zubulake
v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
412. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217.
413. Id.
414. See id.

415. See generally Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The
IncreasingVulnerability of ElectronicInformation, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 18-21 (2006).
416. Id. at 18-19 (internal citations omitted). However, at least one court has
implied that certain kinds of data that are "transient" or "ephemeral" (meaning that
the data ordinarily have an extremely short lifespan prior to deletion) are not covered
by the duty to preserve until another party actually requests the data. Arista Records,
LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 2d 409, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Deleted data
might fairly be considered ephemeral data. See id. The converse of this proposition,
however, is the somewhat disturbing proposition that a litigant has a duty to retain
this transient data, including all deleted data, once the data has been requested in
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a producer had no duty to preserve until a party requested
discovery.417
The duty to preserve includes a coordinate duty to exercise a
reasonable effort in good faith to identify relevant materials prior to
deletion.418 However, because it is impossible to prove the contents of
computer files that have truly been deleted, parties must take steps
that will assure courts and adverse parties that deleted computer
files contained no data relevant to pending litigation.419 Therefore, it
is logical to assume that the duty to preserve causes reasonably
cautious parties to avoid the risky deletion of ESI.420 Indeed,
organizations may be reluctant to delete any data, because of the
possibility of unforeseeable consequences. In the context of the large
organization that is routinely involved in litigation, the duty may
prevent the real implementation of any program to purge data that
the organization no longer has any business need to retain. Thus, the
preservation duty itself places significant additional costs on
litigants.
1.

Sanctions for Spoliation

But the costs associated with the preservation duty include not
only the costs of compliance, but the costs of ancillary litigation to
assess and remedy noncompliance. In federal courts, when a party
deletes ESI to which the duty to preserve has attached, a court will
consider sanctioning the party for spoliation under Rule 37 or the
court's inherent authority.421 While the traditional definition of

discovery. See id. Since reliably retaining such data would require the litigant to
suspend its use of the corresponding information system, such a requirement could be
costly indeed. See id.
417. Crist, supra note 415, at 19; see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 222
F.R.D. 280, 296-98 (E.D. Va. 2004).
418. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218.
419. See Se. Mech. Servs. v. Brody, No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 69830, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009) (noting the producer's contention that it
cannot prove what was deleted).
420. See id.
421. Crist, supra note 415, at 43-44. Federal courts also occasionally cite their
"inherent power to regulate litigation, [and] preserve and protect the integrity of
proceedings before it." Id. (quoting Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 551 (D.
Minn. 1989)). See also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) ("The
inherent powers of federal courts are those which 'are necessary to the exercise of all
others.' The most prominent of these is the contempt sanction, 'which a judge must
have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in
maintaining the authority and dignity of the court."' (internal citations omitted)).
However, federal courts may be limited in applying sanctions under their inherent
authority to situations where a party acts in bad faith. Id. at 766-67. But see Harlan v.
Lewis, 982 F.2d 1255, 1260 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding bad faith is not a prerequisite
"to every possible disciplinary exercise of the court's inherent power"). Whether the
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spoliation is "the intentional destruction of evidence,"422 there is a
trend in the federal courts of sanctioning parties even for
unintentional destruction of evidence. In the landmark Zubulake
case, Judge Scheindlin stated that spoliation was "the destruction or
significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property
for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable
litigation."423 In other words, spoliation is a breach of the duty to
preserve.424 Judge Scheindlin recently reiterated her view: "By now,
it should be abundantly clear that the duty to preserve means what
it says and that a failure to preserve records-paper or electronicand to search in the right places for those records, will inevitably
result in the spoliation of evidence."425
Because the federal rules' approach to discovery is premised on
the notion that fair adjudication is most likely when all parties share
relevant evidence, the destruction of relevant data strikes at the
heart of the idea of fair adjudication.426 Accordingly, when a producer
fails to produce requested information-electronically stored or in
paper form-the court will apply sanctions ranging from awards of
costs, fines, adverse jury instructions, and, in extreme cases, adverse
summary or default judgment.427 However, the ease with which ESI
can be deleted, combined with the fact that organizations routinely
purge electronically stored information,428 has led some federal
courts to sanction more broadly for the loss of relevant data.
Not all federal courts are moving to a broader view of the
propriety of sanctions for spoliation. Indeed, the various circuits of
the U.S. Courts of Appeals are split on how a court should determine
whether to sanction a party for the deletion of responsive data, and,
if so, what sanction is most appropriate.429 In the Second Circuit, for
instance, a court can sanction a party for negligent spoliation.430 The
court cites its inherent authority or rule 37 to sanction a party may turn primarily on
whether the court has issued an order mandating the discovery. Daval Steel Prod. v.
M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1363 (2d Cir. 1991). If so, sanctions are imposed under
rule 37. Id. Otherwise, sanctions are imposed under the court's inherent authority. Id.
422. Stevenson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Rodgers v. CWR Constr. Inc., 33 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Ark. 2000)).
423. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting
West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)).
424. See id.
425. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 685 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
426. Crist, supranote 415, at 43-44.
427. Id.; SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 387.
428. Infra, Part III.C.2.
429. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 386-88.

430. Id. at 387. Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge FinancialCorp., 306 F.3d 99
(2d Cir. 2002), illustrates the Second Circuit's approach to sanctions for failure to
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Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits appear to be generally
following the Second Circuit's view that negligent spoliation is
sufficient to warrant a sanction.431 By contrast, in the Eighth Circuit,
a court requires "a finding of intentional destruction indicating a
desire to suppress the truth."432 The Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth
CircuitS433 follow a middle ground.434 They generally require the
proponent of sanctions to show the producer's bad faith.435 However,
produce relevant information during discovery. During the course of litigation on a
breach of contract, DeGeorge sought the production of e-mails relevant to the
controversy. Id. at 102. Residential Funding asserted that they were not able to
restore the requested data on their own, and retained an appropriate recovery vendor
to assist them. Id. at 102-03. Residential Funding's recovery vendor also purportedly
had trouble. Id. at 104. As trial neared, DeGeorge finally hired its own recovery
vendor, and asked for direct access to the backup tapes that contained the requested emails. Id. DeGeorge was able to obtain the responsive e-mails within a few days. Id.
Therefore, DeGeorge moved for sanctions against Residential Funding. Id. at 105.
The district court denied the sanctions motion. Id. The district court concluded that
DeGeorge had shown only that Residential Funding had acted with negligence, and
that mere negligence was insufficient to support a sanction. Id. The Court of Appeals
vacated, concluding that even negligence was sufficient to allow the district court to
impose a discovery sanction. Id. at 113. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for a
new hearing on the sanctions motion, and ordered that DeGeorge be offered the
opportunity to conduct discovery on the sanctions motion itself. Id.
431. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 387-88; see also Realnetworks, Inc. v.
DVD Copy Control Ass'n, 264 F.R.D. 517, 523 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("A party's destruction
of evidence need not be in 'bad faith' to warrant a court's imposition of sanctions....
District courts may impose sanctions against a party that merely had notice that the
destroyed evidence was potentially relevant to litigation... . However, a party's motive
or degree of fault in destroying evidence is relevant to what sanction, if any, is
imposed.") (internal citations omitted).
432. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 387. Stevenson v. Union Pacific Railroad,
354 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2004), illustrates the Eighth Circuit's approach. Stevenson
alleged that the railroad had spoliated relevant evidence, but the railroad argued that
the evidence at issue was destroyed merely as part of a routine records management
program. Id. at 743. The evidence at issue was stored on tapes that Union Pacific
reused after ninety days. Id. at 747. Union Pacific contended that, by the time the
lawsuit was filed, the tapes had already been reused, and their contents overwritten.
Id. The district court concluded that Union Pacific had destroyed the tapes in bad faith
because Union Pacific was often involved in the kind of litigation at issue and should
have know that the documents would be relevant to the litigation, and, therefore, the
duty to preserve had attached before the plaintiffs had filed their complaint. Id. The
district court also concluded, however, that the policy of reusing tapes was "not
unreasonable or instituted in bad faith." Id. The Court of Appeals nonetheless
reversed. Id. at 748-49. It concluded that Union Pacific had merely been negligent,
and, while negligence was sufficient to support some sanction, it was not egregious
enough to support a sanction as severe as the adverse inference instruction. Id.
433. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land O'Lakes Farmland Feed, LLC, 244
F.R.D. 614, 635 (D. Colo. 2007) (concluding the Tenth Circuit still required a showing
of bad faith as a condition precedent to the application of sanctions).
434. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 387.
435. Id.

20111

E-DISCOVERY'S THREAT TO CIVIL LITIGATION

581

with the increased prominence of e-discovery issues, there is "a clear
trend away from the 'mens rea' or 'scienter' approach of these
[middle-ground] circuits."436
When courts find that sanctions are appropriate, they weigh the
prejudice to the requesting party437 and the fault of the spoiling
party438 to determine the appropriate sanction. A proper sanction
restores the party harmed by the spoliation to a position comparable
to the position the party would have been in but for the loss of the
relevant data,439 and deters further spoliation.440 Some courts have
awarded default judgments based solely on a party's "[dieliberate,
willful and contumacious disregard of the judicial process."441
However, courts more frequently use the adverse inference
instruction to attempt to restore the balance that is lost as a result of
the destruction of evidence.442 The adverse inference instruction
allows the factfinder to "assume that the destroyed evidence would
have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction."443
Courts also consider the prejudice to the requesting party when
evidence is destroyed.444 Some courts have refused to grant sanctions
for spoliation without a showing of prejudice.445 This creates a
dilemma for requestors that occurs in several areas of e-discovery
law: they are required to put on evidence about what the deleted
evidence would have shown.446 If the requestor has an alternative
source of this information, they can show with some clarity what the
evidence would have shown, but can probably show little prejudice
because they have the alternative source. When a requesting party
436. Id.
437. Crist, supra note 415, at 50; see also Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 748 (analyzing the
prejudice to the plaintiff of defendant's spoliation).
438. See, e.g., Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Because
failures to produce relevant evidence fall 'along a continuum of fault-ranging from
innocence through degrees of negligence to intentionality,' . . . the severity of a
sanction may, depending on the circumstances of the case, correspond to the party's
fault.") (quoting Welsh v. United States, 844 F.2d 1239, 1246 (6th Cir. 1988)).
439. Crist, supra note 415, at 46, 50.
440. See, e.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting
that a sanction for spoliation has "evidentiary, prophylactic, punitive, and remedial
rationales").
441. Crist, supra note 415, at 45; see also Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. American
Fundware, Inc., 133 F.R.D. 166, 169-70 (D. Colo. 1990) (awarding default judgment as
a result of intentional destruction of evidence).
442. Crist, supra note 415, at 47-48.
443. Id. at 47.
444. E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
445. E.g., Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007).
446. Zubulake, 229 F.R.D. at 439; see also Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal
v. Banc of Am. Secs., LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("It is often
impossible to know what lost documents would have contained.").
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lacks an alternative source, it may simply be unable to prove
prejudice.447 Thus, because of the difficulty of proving prejudice,
parties may occasionally conclude that they are better for furtively
destroying damaging documents rather than disclosing them.448
While spoliation is not recognized as a tort in federal courts,
some states do recognize spoliation as a tort.449 The tort may
encompass both intentional and negligent spoliation.450 In the states
that recognize it, it is an "interference tort" that is "defined as
intentional or negligent interference with a prospective civil action by
destruction of evidence."451
2.

The Records Management Program

In spite of the danger of routinely purging ESI, organizations
have a legitimate interest in destroying data to limit the universe of
potentially responsive information they must search in the course of
discovery and reduce the other costs associated with storing
information that they no longer have any business need to retain.452
To that end, many organizations have established record retention
policies.453 These policies create timeframes for the retention of
certain kinds of documents (including ESI).454 They ordinarily
mandate the deletion or destruction of documents after an
established period of time.455 For instance, a record retention policy
might specify that an invoice must be retained for three years after
payment, or that an organization's financial statements should be

447.

See Pension Comm., 684 F. Supp. 2d at 468.

448. Steffen Nolte, The Spoliation Tort: An Approach to Underlying Principles, 26
ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 354 (1994). See also Robert L. Tucker, The Flexible Doctrine of
Spoliation of Evidence: Cause of Action, Defense, Evidentiary Presumption, and
Discovery Sanction, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 67, 67 (1996); JAMIE S. GORELICK, ET AL.,

§ 4.1 to § 4.11 (2010) (describing the states' approaches to
the tort and noting that California recognized the tort in 1984, but rejected it in 1998).
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

449. Devin Murphy, The Discovery of Electronic Data in Litigation: What
Practitionersand Their Clients Need to Know, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1825, 1855-56
(2001). See generally GORELICK ET AL., supranote 448.
450. Nolte, supra note 448, at 360.
451. Id.
452. See Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 222 F.R.D. 280, 294-95 (E.D. Va. 2004).
453. Id. These policies are also called document retention policies and document (or
record) destruction policies. See Crist, supra note 415, at 34-45. However,
organizations have been less than stellar at clarifying their records management
plan's application to electronically stored information. Id. For instance, in a recent
survey, forty-three percent of surveyed organizations "did not include digital records in
their retention [policies]." Id. at 35. And, forty-nine percent of survey respondents
reported they had no "formal e-mail retention policy." Id.
454. Crist, supranote 415, at 36.
455. See id.
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kept indefinitely.456 Such policies balance the organization's need to
retain records with its ability to afford to maintain and search them.
457 This is especially true with backup tapes, which are often recycled
on a rigid schedule.458 These policies normally allow the employees of
organization to engage in routine destruction of documents, whether
stored electronically or on paper. Ideally, as a result, there are fewer
documents to store and to review in the case of litigation.459
Sometimes the destruction of data or documents under a records
management program may be performed manually, but, in the
context of electronically stored information, computer systems
themselves often manage the deletion of data on a continual basis.460
A committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, in
proposing the amendment that became the safe harbor provision of
Rule 37(e), explicitly noted that:
[C]omputer systems lose, alter, or destroy information as part of
routine operations, making the risk of losing information
significantly greater than with paper. Even when litigation is
anticipated, it can be very difficult to interrupt or suspend the
routine operation of computer systems to isolate and preserve
discrete parts of the information they overwrite, delete, or update
on an ongoing basis, without creating problems for the larger
system. Routine cessation or suspension of these features of
computer operation is also undesirable; the result would be even
greater accumulation of duplicative and irrelevant data that must
be reviewed, making discovery more expensive and timeconsuming. At the same time, a litigant's right to obtain evidence
must be protected. There is considerable uncertainty as to whether
a party must, at risk of severe sanctions, interrupt the operation of
the electronic information systems it is using to avoid any loss of
information because of the possibility that the information might
be sought in discovery. The advisory committee has heard strong

456. See id.
457. E.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(noting that organizations routinely recycle backup tapes); Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon
Tech., Inc., 222 F.R.D. 280, 294 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting that "virtually all companies
have document retention policies").
458. But see Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 218 (concluding that inaccessible backup tapes
are presumptively excluded from the duty to preserve as long as they are indeed
inaccessible).
459. Rambus, 222 F.R.D. at 295. Of course, achieving compliance with document
retention policies can be difficult, especially in large organizations. Crist, supra note
415, at 35 (noting that according to a 2003 survey, thirty-eight percent of respondents
failed to follow their own policy).
460. SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITITEE ON RULES
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 32 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter SUMMARY],

available at

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rulesandpolicies/rules/Reports/STO9-2005.pdf.

584

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:2

arguments in support of better guidance in the rules.461

Some circuits are more forgiving when responsive or potentially
responsive data is lost because of a records management program. 462
The Eighth Circuit generally does not allow for the imposition of
sanctions based solely on negligence, so a litigant that fails to
''rescue" data from automated deletion under a records management
plan that is otherwise reasonable and instituted in good faith is
unlikely to face a sanction as severe as an adverse inference
instruction.463 In Union Pacific, the court concluded that "[w]here a
routine document retention policy has been followed in this context,
we now clarify that there must be some indication of an intent to
destroy the evidence for the purpose of obstructing or suppressing the
truth in order to impose the sanction of an adverse inference
instruction."464 Nevertheless, even the negligent litigant might face
lesser sanctions, such as the award of costs and attorney fees.465
Other circuits, noting that "[i]t makes little difference to the
party victimized by the destruction of evidence whether that act was
done willfully or negligently," give no extra slack to parties who
delete data because a document to which the duty to preserve had
attached was deleted pursuant to an established records
management program. 466
Indeed, in Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG,467 the court was
actively hostile to the plaintiffs records management program. The
court concluded that since Rambus instituted its records
management program out of a desire to reduce the amount of
information it would have to search through in the case of litigation,
Rambus intended the program to delete evidence relevant to
litigation.468 The court found further support for its conclusion in the
fact that Rambus was not expecting to be sued during the time period
in which it instituted its document retention program.46 9 Therefore,

the court reasoned, any discovery concerns must stem from litigation
that Rambus itself intended to bring.470 Finally, the court reasoned,
461. Id. at 32-33.
462. Crist, supra note 415, at 48.
463. See Stevenson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2004);
Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988).
464. Stevenson, 354 F.3d at 747.
465. See Crist,supra note 415, at 48; Union Pacific, 354 F.3d at 747 (noting that the
trial court did not err in concluding Union Pacific's negligence met the bad faith
requirement, and was sanctionable).
466. Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
467. 222 F.R.D. 280 (E.D. Va. 2004).
468. Id. at 294-95.
469. Id. at 295.
470. Id.
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the routine deletion of records should have been suspended when it
did anticipate bringing its suits.471 Although the Rambus court has a
point, the court's ruling would prevent organizations like Rambus
from ever actually engaging in the routine deletion of data when they
anticipate litigation.472 Likewise, an organization that is a routine
litigation target would be hard-pressed to implement a records
management program. 473
3.

Safe Harbor Provisions of Rule 37(e)

Recognizing the difficulties and undesirability of suspending
record management programs to accommodate the duty to preserve,
the Federal Rules provide a safe harbor provision to shield parties
from sanctions for data lost because of the good faith operation of an
information system: 474
(e) Failure to Provide Electronically Stored Information. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under
these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of
475
an electronic information system.
Unfortunately, in practice, Rule 37(e) no longer provides any safe
harbor.476 Courts have generally concluded that, when the duty to
preserve attaches to evidence, the safe harbor of Rule 37(e) does not
apply because a party cannot, in good faith, delete this relevant
evidence, even as part of a records management program. 477 Indeed,

471. Id.
472. See id. at 294-98. Compare Rambus, 222 F.R.D. at 294-98 with Concord Boat
Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., No. LR-C-95-781, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24068, at *17 (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) ("Arguably, most e-mails, excluding purely personal
communications, could fall under the umbrella of 'relevant to potential future
litigation.' For example, the e-mail could contain 'stray remarks' which would have a
bearing on some legal issue. Thus, it would be necessary for a corporation to basically
maintain all of its e-mail. Such a proposition is not justified.").
473. Rambus, 222 F.R.D. at 294-98.
474. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e); see also Favro, supra note 280, at 20 (noting the rule is
intended to protect parties from "the incidental alteration or deletion of electronically
stored information that frequently results from the 'distinctive' nature of computer
operations").
475. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e). This rule used to be Rule 37(f). See SUMMARY, supra note
460, at 32-33. Doe v. Norwalk Community College, 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn.
2007).
476. DAN H. WILLOUGHBY, JR. & ROSE HUNTER JONES, SANCTIONS FOR EDISCOVERY VIOLATIONS: BY THE NUMBERS 3, 22-26 (2010), available at
http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsfl$defaultview/24BBAF81A
E57DCC9852576DB005D7CC7/$File/Dan%2OWilloughby,%2Rose%2OJones,%2OSanc
tions%20for%20E-Discoveryo/o2OViolations.pdfOpenElement (last visited Feb. 25,
2011); SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 403.
477. E.g., Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. College, 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007);
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once a party is aware of or should reasonably anticipate litigation,
the party has the duty to implement a litigation hold.478 A party who
fails to implement the litigation hold cannot take advantage of the
safe haven.479
Doe v. Norwalk Community College4so illustrates this point.
When the producing party could not produce e-mails that had been
requested, they claimed they were covered by the safe-harbor
provisions

of then-Rule

37(f)

(now

Rule

37(e)).481

The

court

disagreed.482 The court concluded that the community college's
inability to produce e-mail was not protected under the rule because
the college had not instituted any effort to retain relevant
information, and, even if the college had done so, the college also had
not shown that loss of data resulted from a "routine" program to
purge information.483
Indeed, the second part of the court's conclusion in Norwalk
Community College reveals another problem with the safe harbor
provision of Rule 37(e). A litigant must be prepared with appropriate
evidence and argument to justify its case of entitlement to the safe
harbor provisions before relying on their protection. 484 In particular,
it must show that it "act[ed] affirmatively to prevent the system from
destroying or altering information, even if such destruction would
occur in the regular course of business."485 Thus, when a party is
forced to rely on Rule 37(e), it must endure the potentially high cost
of proving that it deserves the protection.486
There are a few other reasons that a litigant should not expect
the safe harbor provision of Rule 37(e) to provide any protection from
sanctions. First, the rule itself contains an exception for "exceptional
circumstances."487 This suggests that a showing of extreme prejudice
to the requesting party's case might overcome the safe harbor.488 The
rule also limits the application of the safe harbor to "sanctions under
Peskoffv. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007).
478. Norwalk Cmty. College, 248 F.R.D. at 378; Peskoff v. Faber, 244 F.R.D. 54, 60
(D.D.C. 2007).
479. Norwalk Cmty. College, 248 F.R.D. at 378. Similarly, in Peskoff v. Faber, when
the defendant failed to turn off a routine that automatically deleted e-mail that
reached a certain age, the defendant was not entitled to claim the protection of the
safe harbor now in Rule 37(e). 244 F.R.D. at 60. See also supra Part II.D.5.
480. 248 F.R.D. 372 (D. Conn. 2007).
481. Id. at 378.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. See id.
485. Id.
486. See id.
487. FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e).
488. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 402.
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these rules."489 This may indicate that the safe harbor does not
protect a party from a sanction imposed under the court's inherent
authority, rather than under the Rule 37.490 Finally, even the term
"electronic information system" may limit the protection afforded the
litigant under the rule if, the litigant, as the operator of the
information system, directed the deletion through the configuration
or programming of the information system. 491
4.

The Litigation Hold

Because of the danger inherent in deleting data that an adverse
party could claim the duty to preserve had attached, the "best
practices" in e-discovery require potential litigants to implement
litigation holds.492 The litigation hold itself can be an expensive
undertaking, and is attended by its own perils.
The litigation hold generally entails (1) identifying when a
controversy has ripened into a stage that implicates the duty to
preserve, 493 (2) identifying members of the organization that might
have relevant information,494 (3) directing these members to retain
this information,495 and (4) monitoring and enforcing compliance
during the course of the resolution of the controversy.4 96 Counsel for
parties have an ethical duty during the course of the lifecycle of the
litigation hold to monitor their client's compliance with the program,
and to advise them of the "full range of potential negative
consequences that could result from the destruction of evidence,
including contempt of court, civil and criminal penalties and
sanctions, default judgment, or dismissal."497 The litigation hold also
requires counsel to directly engage with custodians of electronically
stored information to ensure that the information is retained.498 This
may require counsel to have a full understanding of the
organization's information technology architecture and practices, as
well as the organization's document retention plan.499 Indeed,

489. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
490. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 403.
491. See id.
492. E.g., Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. College, 248 F.R.D. 372, 377 (D. Conn. 2007).
493. See Crist, supra note 415, at 36; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 220 F.R.D. 212,
217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
494. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 146-47. Scheindlin observes that this step
of identifying the data to be preserved requires counsel to first step through each
possible claim and defense to identify the corresponding relevant data. Id.
495. Id. at 147; Crist, supranote 415, at 39.
496. Crist, supra note 415, at 37-39; SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 147-149.
497. Crist, supra note 415, at 39.
498. Id. at 39-40.
499. Id. at 39-41.
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counsel may need to even take possession of relevant backup tapes
for safekeeping.500 Because of the complexity and thoroughness
needed to effectively maintain a litigation hold, organizations must
spend significant time and money to execute them effectively.501
Criticism of the Duty to Preserve

5.

There are a variety of reasons to criticize the duty to preserve. It
encourages parties to threaten litigation as early as possible so that
the duty to preserve attaches to relevant information that is adverse
to the eventual producer.502 It is also too broad, because it attaches to
information that a litigant knows or should know to be relevant, even
before any request for the information is made, and without taking
into account alternative sources of the same information.503 It
essentially imposes on parties the duty to identify and preserve the
opposing party's sources of evidence, without passing any of the
associated cost along to the party that benefits from this expenditure
of time and money.
IV. THE E-DISCOVERY RULES IN STATE AND FOREIGN COURTS

A.

Cost-Shifting in State Court

Not all states share the federal courts' "producer-pays"
presumption. In California, for instance, Cal. Code Civ. P. §
2031.280(e) requires that "If necessary, the responding party at the
reasonable expense of the demanding party shall ... translate any

data compilation504 included in the demand into reasonably usable
form."505 This rule makes a requesting party pay for the reasonable
costs of making an inaccessible source of ESI accessible, without
respect to any of the factors courts consider under the Zubulake or
500.

Id. at 41.

501.

SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supranote 48, at 152.

502. See Southeastern Mech. Servs. v. Brody, No. 8:08-CV-1151-T-30EAJ, 2009 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69830, at *10 (M.D. Fla. July 24, 2009) (concluding sanctions were
inappropriate where backup tapes were recycled before duty to preserve arose).
503. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note (noting the duty to preserve
applies even to inaccessible sources of information).
504. We assume that the term "data compilations," as used in various state rules of
civil procedure, is roughly synonymous with "electronically stored information" in the
FRCP. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 164, at 2 (noting the FRCP uses the term
"electronically stored information" rather than the term "data compilation" and
identify it as a distinctive category of information subject to discovery obligations on
par with "documents" and "things").
505. The California legislature passed this provision specifically to create
uniformity and bring predictability to e-discovery cases: "[iun order to eliminate
uncertainty and confusion regarding the discovery of electronically stored information,
and thereby minimize unnecessary and costly litigation that adversely impacts access
to the courts." 2009 Cal. ALS 5; Stats 2009 ch 5.

2011]

E-DISCOVERY'S THREAT TO CIVIL LITIGATION

589

Rowe Entertainment tests.506 Of course, the California rule applies,
like the Zubulake cost shifting analysis, only to inaccessible sources
to ESI.507
Similarly, Texas and Mississippi have a similar procedure to
protect producers from the cost of producing ESI in a format other
than what the producer maintains in the ordinary course of business:
To obtain discovery of data or information that exists in electronic
or magnetic form, the requesting party must specifically request
production of electronic or magnetic data and specify the form in
which the requesting party wants it produced. The responding
party must produce the electronic or magnetic data that is
responsive to the request and is reasonably available to the
responding party in its ordinary course of business. If the
responding party cannot[-]through reasonable efforts[-]retrieve
the data or information requested or produce it in the form
requested, the responding party must state an objection complying
with these rules. If the court orders the responding party to comply
with the request, the court must also order that the requesting
party pay the reasonable expenses of any extraordinary steps
required to retrieve and produce the information.50
Thus, the Texas and Mississippi rule, like the California rule,
requires that, when the requested ESI is reasonably available in the
ordinary course of business, the producer must provide it, at its own
cost.50 9 However, if the effort to produce the data as requested
imposes a burden in excess of a "reasonable effort," then the producer
can move for cost shifting.sio The only costs that are shifted are those
associated with the "reasonable expenses of any extraordinary steps
required to retrieve and produce the information."511 As with the
California rule, the Texas and Mississippi rule does not shift the
costs associated with production of all ESI, nor does it shift the
associated costs of ordinary searches or privilege review.512
The New York rule goes the furthest in requiring requesting
parties to pay for the costs of their requests, because New York has

506. Mazza et al., supra note 94, 1 115-16. See also Toshiba Am. Elec. Components
v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 538-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (concluding this
provision is "unequivocal. We need not engage in protracted statutory analysis because
its plain language clearly states that if translation is necessary, the responding party
must do it at the demanding party's reasonable expense").
507. Toshiba, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 538-39.
508. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 196.4; Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).
509. See id.; Mazza et al., supra note 94, at 61.
510. In re Weekly Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 322 (Tex. 2009).
511. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 196.4; Weekly Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 322.
512. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4; Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5); Weekly Homes, 295 S.W.3d
at 322.
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never adopted the "producer-pays" presumption.513 On the contrary,
in New York courts, "the presumption at the outset is that the
requesting party pays for discovery."514 "Therefore, the analysis of
whether electronic discovery should be permitted in New York is
much simpler than it is in the federal courts. The court need only
determine whether the material is discoverable and whether the
party seeking the discovery is willing to bear the cost of
production . .

. ."515

B. Foreign Countries
In a 2009 report for the United Kingdom Judiciary, the United
States was singled out as being "the only overseas jurisdiction
without cost shifting."516 The report concludes that, while the
"producer pays" presumption may "promote greater access to justice,"
it also fosters "more claims lacking in merit."17 Moreover, the
American rule tends to require a higher level of harm to make a case
viable, and, in the absence of adequate judicial supervision, wellresourced litigants, even if their claims are weak, can cause an
adverse party to incur "irrecoverable costs."518
Indeed, to the extent that foreign jurisdictions even permit
discovery, they are far more conservative in permitting it than the
American courts.5 19 Data protection and privacy laws of foreign
nations constrain the extraterritorial application of otherwise liberal
discovery practices of American courts.520 Even so, foreign courts face
the same problems of rising e-discovery costs and unwieldy document
requests. 521
513. Mazza et al., supra note 94, 1 118.
514. Id. (emphasis added).
515. Lipco Elec. Corp. v. ASG Consulting Corp., No. 8775/01, slip op. at 8 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Aug. 18, 2004).
516. RUPERT JACKSON, 2 REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: PRELIMINARY REPORT
474 (May 2009), availableat http://www.1awcostingltd.co.uklimages/volume2.pdf.
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. For recent commentary on e-discovery problems in a variety of instances, see

generally Wendy Akbar, E-Discovery World Wars: The Privacy Menace, E-DISCOVERY
BYTES (Jan. 12, 2009), http://ediscovery.quarles.com/2009/01/articles/internationalissues/ediscovery-world-wars-the-privacy-menace/;
THE
SEDONA
CONFERENCE
WORKING GROUP 7, THE SEDONA CANADA PRINCIPLES: ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION (Feb. 2007 Public Comment Draft), available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/contentimiscFiles/2 07WG7pubcomment.pdf.
(providing a comprehensive background and discussion of e-discovery generally,
including some discussion of cost in foreign jurisdiction).
520. See supra Introduction and text accompanying notes 12-32.
521. The University of Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies has compiled an
extensive list of litigation cost reports from around the world. The Centre put on an
international conference in July of 2009 in which they presented this research from
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Attorneys seeking discovery within the European Union may
need to overcome the EU's stringent data protection laws.522 A
foreign party seeking protection against compelled discovery in an
American court has the burden of proving that the foreign data
protection law actually prohibits production of the data at issue.523
But, if so proven, these data protection laws may, in some cases,
curtail discovery.524
And, there are a variety of privacy protections that protect data
from production. For example, "the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") has held that the right to private communications in the
workplace is a fundamental freedom covered under the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms .. . . "525 Employees' telephone calls and emails come under
the umbrella of "private life" discussed in the Convention treatises.526
Accordingly, one French court interpreting the Convention principles
found "that under no circumstances may an employer inspect an
employee's email, files, or computer, even" if the employer suspects
wrongdoing on the part of the employee.527 Thus "private life"
materials from the workplace would likely be non-discoverable in
most European courts.
Throughout the EU, the European Data Protection Directive (the
"Directive") establishes a regulatory framework around the
movement of e-discovery and the treatment of personal data in the
legal sphere.528 The Directive allows for the transfer of personal data

thirty-three jurisdictions. The research was made available to Lord Justice Jackson to
help in his report on Civil Litigation Costs, which is referenced in this section of the
article. Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Research Programme in European and
Comparative Civil Justice Systems, UNIV. OF OXFORD, http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/
europeancivil-justice-systems.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). See also Centre for
Socio-Legal Studies, List of Contributors and Reports, UNIV. OF OXFORD,
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/COSTOFLITIGATIONDOCUMENTSANDREPORTS.php
(last visited Jan. 31, 2011).
522. Erica M. Davila, InternationalE-Discovery: Navigating the Maze, 8 U. PIrT. J.
TECH. L. POL'Y 5, 11 (2008).
523. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig, Misc. No. 99-197 TFH, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8904, at *44 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001).
524. Davila, supra note 522, 11 9-14. But see Vitamin Antitrust Litig., 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8904, at *56 n.20 ("[A] federal court may order a party to comply with
discovery even if such compliance may violate another sovereign's laws").
525. Davila, supra note 522, 1 11; see also European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by protocols nos. 11 and
14, Rome, 4.XI.1950, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html
1005.htm.
526. Davila, supranote 522, 17.
527. Id. 1 18.
528. Id.
11-13; see also, Global Class Actions Exchange, STANFORD LAW SCH.
http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/globalclassactionlindex.html (last visited Nov. 7,
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between countries "only if the country receiving the data ensures an
adequate level of protection."529 Because of the Directive, the United
States Department of Commerce has had to negotiate a "safe harbor"
with the European Union, which provides requirements that US
companies must choose to adhere to in order to participate in the
exchange of personal data with EU countries.530
Under the Directive, personal data includes e-mail and other
commonly requested electronically stored information. In In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, German defendants claimed that the
German Data Protection Act prohibited the disclosure of employee
data that the plaintiff had requested.531 The defendant claimed that
complying with the court's discovery order, in violation of the
German Data Protection Act, would be a criminal offense exposing
532
The district court
the defendant to substantial fines or prison term.
held that even if the German Data Protection Act prohibited
disclosure, the plaintiff could compel disclosure on a showing that (1)
"information at issue is necessary to protect public interests and/or
interests to the plaintiff; and (2) data subjects have no 'legitimate
interest' in preventing disclosure of the information."533 The court
ultimately found that the defendant had expressed "some legitimate
privacy law concerns" and ordered further proceedings to "determine
whether that requested information is absolutely essential to [the
plaintiffs'] case."534
Other countries, such as France, have statutes that aim to
prevent American-style discovery.535 The French blocking statute
prohibits any discovery whatsoever:
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws
and regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or
disclose, in writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial,
industrial, financial, or technical documents or information leading
2010) (containing reports from over 50 countries on class action practices in each
jurisdiction and including some limited information in litigation costs and practices).
529. Davila, supra note 522, 1 12.

530. Id.; see also Benjamin Wright, Cross-Border eDisclosure:Blocking Statutes and
International E-Discovery, ELECTRONIC DATA RECORDS LAW: How TO WIN EDISCOVERY (Feb. 25, 2009), http://legal-beagle.typepad.com/wrights-legaLbeagle/
foreign.
531. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig, Misc. No. 99-197 (TFH), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8904, at *43 n.11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001).

532.

Vitamins Antitrust Litig, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8904, at *46-47; see also In re

Vitamin Antitrust Litig, Misc. No. 99-197 (TFH), MDL No. 1285, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11536 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2001) (providing the special master's original analysis of
the discovery dispute).
533. Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8904, at *50.

534. Id. at *53-54.
535. See Wright, supra note 530.
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to the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign judicial or
administrative proceedings or in connection therewith.536
Indeed, the French blocking statute "imposes criminal liability,"
exposing violators to fines and even imprisonment.537 Many of these
"blocking statutes" were in fact enacted simply to thwart discovery
requests from United States entities or courts. 538 These include
Canada's Business Records Protection Act and statutes created "in
response to the United States Federal Maritime Commission's
investigation of anticompetitive practices of international shipping
conferences in the 1960s."539
Foreign nations' secrecy laws may also hinder discovery efforts
in American courts.540 Secrecy laws commonly protect the "disclosure
of bank customer and corporate data."541 These laws afford
significant protection to European entities in litigation. 542 These laws
include Article 45 of the Swiss Bank Law, the German Bank Secrecy
privilege, and secrecy laws such as those seen in China.543
These privacy laws also create choice of law issues for American
companies in litigation.544 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at
times intersect with the Hague Convention on Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the "Hague Convention").545
Both govern discovery of international data in American courts. The
Hague Convention covers forty-four nations, but the Convention
applies only between national parties.546 It "provides for [the]
compulsion of evidence by letters of request, and for the taking of
depositions before consuls and court-appointed commissioners."547 In
the American courts, parties requesting Hague Convention
procedures to be used over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bear

536.

Davila, supra note 522,

1

20 (quoting CODE PtNAL [C. PtNAL] No. 80-538 (Fr.))

537. Courtney Ingraffia Barton, Framing the InternationalE-Discovery Issues: Data
Across the Globe, THE DISCOVERY STANDARD, http://law.lexisnexis.com/litigation-news
/articles/article.aspx?groupid=eQSqfLggRQQ=&article=U3VI5IA+t4c=
(last visited
Jan. 31, 2011).
538. Davila, supra note 522,
20, 23.
539. See id.
21-22.
540. Id. TT 24-28.
541. Id. 24.
542. Id. 1 24-28.
543. See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1479
(9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that a Chinese corporation could not rely on China's state
secrecy law to shield it from sanctions when it failed to raise the secrecy statute until
defending the motion for sanctions).
544. Davila, supranote 522,
29-30.
545. Id.
546. Id. T 32.
547. Id.
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the burden of persuasion.548
Although international barriers to e-discovery are prevalent in
most other areas of the world, the United Kingdom employs a scheme
similar to the United States.549 Part 31 of the Civil Procedure Rules
concerns disclosure and inspection of documents.550 The "Practice
Direction" portion of the rule deals directly with electronic
disclosure.551 Although this section does not consider the cost of ediscovery specifically, it does suggest a reasonableness balancing of
the burden of electronic disclosure in subsection 2A.4. The subsection
reads:
The factors that may be relevant in deciding the reasonableness of
a search for electronic documents include (but are not limited to)
the following:
(a) The number of documents involved.
(b) The nature and complexity of the proceedings.
(c) The ease and expense of retrieval of any particular document.
This includes:
(i) The accessibility of electronic documents or data including
e-mail communications on computer systems, servers, back-up
systems and other electronic devices or media that may
contain such documents taking into account alterations or
developments in hardware or software systems used by the
disclosing party and/or available to enable access to such
documents.
(ii) The location of relevant electronic documents, data,
computer systems, servers, back-up systems and other
electronic devices or media that may contain such documents.
(iii) The likelihood of locating relevant data.
(iv) The cost of recovering any electronic documents.
(v) The cost of disclosing and providing inspection of any
relevant electronic documents.
(vi) The likelihood that electronic documents will be materially
altered in the course of recovery, disclosure or inspection.
(d) The significance of any document which is likely to be located

548. Id. 1 33; see also Thomas J. Shaw, Ediscovery in Asia/Pacific: U.S. Litigation
Exposure for Asian Companies, AIIM, http://www.aiim.org/infonomics/ediscovery-inasia-pacific-who-has-jurisdiction.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (discussing how nonU.S. companies take Hague Convention rules and discovery costs into account when
analyzing risk of being sued in the United States).
549. See generally JACKSON, supra note 516, at 365-475.
550. Id. at 366.
551. Id.
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during the search. 55 2
The rules also suggest in subsection 2A.5 that "[i]t may be
reasonable to search some or all of the parties' electronic storage
systems," and that it may also be reasonable to complete a keyword
search of an entire system, even if it would not be reasonable to
review every document included in the system.55 3 In effect, these
directions encourage the use of electronic disclosure in discovery
when balanced using a reasonableness analysis.554
Recently, Lord Justice Jackson of the Judiciary of England and
Wales published a Review of Civil Litigation Costs.555 This
comprehensive report on all aspects of Civil Litigation Costs in
England and Wales speaks specifically to the debilitating costs of
electronic discovery/disclosure. Lord Justice Jackson argues that this
balancing and recommended use of electronic disclosure, as discussed
in the Rules, has not become a widespread practice. Often, he says,
the Practice Directions of the Rules are ignored.
The courts in the United Kingdom have only recently begun to
deal with the major problem of electronic disclosure-cost. In October

2008, Digicel (St. Lucia) Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless PLC was decided,
offering some guidance to legal practitioners on how to cope with
mounting electronic disclosure costs. 556 In Digicel, the defendants
had already spent over 22.175 million on discovery, and were being
ordered to spend more.55 7 Leading up to the hearing, the defendants'
solicitors had spent over 6,700 hours searching multiple
international databases.5s8 The Court ordered the defendants'
solicitors to meet with the claimants' solicitors under Court scrutiny
to discuss the continuing disclosure requests.559 Since the defendants'
solicitors had failed to heed the requirements of the Practice
Directions and meet with the claimant solicitors early in the
litigation regarding electronic disclosure requirements, they now
would likely have to repeat much of the work they had already done
at their client's expense.560

552.
553.
554.
555.
2009),

Id.
Id.
See id.
RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT (Dec.
available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uklNR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-

8A93-56FO9672EB6A/O/jacksonfinalreportl4O 110.pdf.
556. Digicel (St. Lucia) Ltd. v Cable & Wireless PLC [2008] EWHC 2522 (Ch)
(appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.orglew/cases/EWHC/Chl2008
/2522.html.
557. Id. 25.
558. Id.
559. Id. 70.
560. Id. 47.
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Digicel is a cautionary reminder to British solicitors to work with
opposing counsel early on in developing disclosure plans that can be
submitted to the Court when disagreements arise. Lord Justice
Jackson explains that the cost of electronic discovery must be
negotiated by the parties at the outset of the litigation and will be
the subject of thorough investigation and reasonableness
balancing.561 He goes on to compare the English practices of
electronic disclosure to those of Australia.562 Australia, he points out,
has recently adopted a Practice Note on January 29, 2009, which sets
out a code to be followed in analyzing how much electronic disclosure
is necessary of a party and suggests initial meetings with opposing
counsel, just as the English rules do.563
CONCLUSION
Equal cost-sharing between the requesting party and the
producing party is the fairest and most efficient way to address the
skyrocketing and debilitating costs of e-discovery. Under an equal
cost sharing regime, requesting parties would bear some of the
burden of their production, and would therefore have an inherent
incentive-independent of judicial intervention and discretion-to
control the scope of their requests and to work with the producing
party to develop keywords, search protocols, and to locate accessible
sources of requested information. Equal cost sharing thus mitigates
the harshness of a rule that would require the requesting party to
pay for production while still assisting impecunious plaintiffs in their
pursuit of justice. More importantly, if the discovery is to remain a
cooperative process, equal cost sharing ensures that both sides to a
lawsuit have a built-in incentive to cooperate in a civil litigation
system that relies so heavily on cooperation between litigants.
Placing the entire cost of production on producing parties means that
producers have no incentive to persevere in locating difficult-toretrieve but relevant data in their information systems, and
requesting parties have no incentive to take costs into account in
making production demands. The result is to entirely exclude from
the judicial system a class of litigants unable to afford such heavy
discovery costs.
Our civil justice system is on an unsustainable trajectory. Equal
cost sharing is the kind of fundamental reform that can truly stem
the ever-expanding cost, scope, and duration of discovery, thereby
ensuring that the courts are indeed open to everyone and will decide

561.
562.
563.

JACKSON, supra note 555, at 40-43.
See id. at 434-37.
Id. at 435.
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cases on their merits rather than on who can impose the highest
discovery costs on their litigation opponents.

